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l\'IEDIATION AND THE AMERICANS WITH 
DISABILITIES ACT 
Ann C. Hodges* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Americans with Disabilities Act1 (ADA), which prohibits 
discrimination against individuals with disabilities by employers, 
by state and local governments, and in public accommodations, 
expressly encourages the use of alternative dispute resolution 
(ADR) to resolve disputes under the Act. The use of ADR to resolve 
ADA disputes is growing. Both the agencies charged with ADA 
enforcement and private organizations are experimenting with 
ADR. While arbitration of ADA disputes is controversial, enthusi-
asm for the use of mediation generally is widespread. 
* Professor of Law, University of Richmond. This Article is based in pa.rt on research 
conducted for and resulting in a recommendation adopted by the Administrative Conference 
of the United States (ACUS). ANN C. HODGES, ADMINISTRATIVE CONF. U.S., REcoMMENDA· 
TIONS AND REP. 1994-1995: DISPUTE REsoLUTION UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABlLITIES 
Ac:r 581 [hereinafter DISPUTE REsOLUTION UNDER THE ADA]. The report nlso is te be 
published at 9 An:MIN. L.J. No. 4 (forthcoming 1996). This Article nnd related report would 
not have been possible without the assistance of people far too numerous te thank 
individually. This Article benefitted significantly from discussions with the staff and 
members of ACUS; officials from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the 
Disability Rights Section of the Department of Justice, the Federal Transit Administration, 
the Federal Highway Administration, and the Federal Communications Commission; 
representatives of various disability groups; attorneys practicing disability law; staffofboth 
the American Association of Retired Persons and the ABA Commission on Physical and 
Mental Disabilities; members of the ADA/ADR Working Group of the Dispute Resolution 
Coalition on Aging and Disability; representatives of the Better Business Bureau; staff 
members of various state and local anti-discrimination agencies; nnd a number of dispute 
resolution professionals. I particularly want te thank Professor Stephen B. Goldberg, who 
initially sparked my interest in mediation when I was his research assistant at Northwestern 
University School of Law, for his insightful comments on the report. The views expressed 
in this Article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the members of 
the Administrative Conference or its committees except where formal recommendations of 
the Conference are cited, or of anyone consulted in connection with the Article. Finally, I 
received invaluable research assistance from Margaret Smither, J.D., 1992; Nicole Rovner 
Beyer, J.D., 1994; Tenley Carroll, J.D., 1995; Penny Elaine Nimmo, J.D., 1994; Jeffrey 
Shapiro, J.D., 1994; Tu-Quynh Vu, J.D., 1995; Mark Andrade, J.D. 1995; and Alissa J. 
Altengy, Class ofl997, all of the University of Richmond. 
1 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. V 1993). 
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This Article will analyze the potential uses of mediation in ADA 
disputes, focusing primarily on employment issues. Part II of the 
Article provides a description and analysis of the mediation process. 
Part III provides an overview of the ADA.2 Part IV examines the 
dispute resolution provisions of the ADA and both the current and 
proposed uses of alternative dispute resolution. Finally, Part V 
analyzes the use of mediation in ADA cases and recommends 
appropriate uses of mediation that will effectuate the purpose of 
the statute. 3 
II. THE MEDIATION PROCESS 
In essence, mediation is settlement negotiation assisted by a 
trained, neutral third party.4 The mediator has no power to 
compel a resolution of the dispute; rather, the mediator helps the 
parties develop options and explore acceptable resolutions of the 
dispute. 5 Introducing a neutral third party into settlement 
negotiations can help the parties overcome obstacles to settle-
ment. 6 
2 Although the Article concentrates on mediation of ADA employment discrimination 
cases, Parts III and IV discuss the other titles of the Act, both because of the ACUS 
recommendation for joint mediation of ADA cases under all titles, see infra notes 151-158 and 
accompanying text, and because ADR efforts under other titles are relevant to mediation of 
employment cases. 
3 The ADA's purpose is: 
(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the 
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities; 
(2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing 
discrimination against individuals with disabilities; 
(3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in 
enforcing the standards established in this Act on behalf of individuals 
with disabilities; and 
(4) to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power 
to enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce, in order 
to address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people 
with disabilities. 
42 u.s.c. § 12101(b). 
~ ADMINISTRATIVE CONF. U.S., IMPLEMENTING THE ADR ACT: GUIDANCE FOR AGENCY 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION SPECIALISTS 5 (Feb. 1992). 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
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The mediator may assist the parties in a number of ways. The 
mediator may help the parties communicate with one another more 
e:ffectively,7 including dealing with emotions which otherwise may 
interfere with settlement possibilities.8 Additionally, the mediator 
helps the parties develop a process for negotiations.9 After 
gathering facts from the parties, the mediator aids the parties in 
generating settlement options by assisting them in defining and 
critically analyzing the problem and by helping them to identify 
their basic interests.10 Furthermore, the mediator serves as a 
reality check, alerting parties to unrealistic expectations or overly 
optimistic views of their prospects for success in other forums.11 
The mediator uses various tactics to accomplish these tasks, 
including joint meetings with the parties, private meetings with the 
individual parties, and strategic breaks in negotiation. Separate 
meetings enable a party to disclose candidly its facts and interests, 
assisting the mediator in shaping negotiations without inappropri-
ately revealing confidential information.12 Throughout the 
process, it is important for the mediator both to build trust between 
the parties and the mediator and to promote cooperative, problem-
solving behavior.13 Through mediation, the parties may reach a 
settlement that meets their needs and which they could not, or did 
not, reach in the absence of mediator intervention. To determine 
whether mediation can play an effective role in dispute settlement 
under the ADA, it is important to analyze the statute and its 
dispute settlement processes. 
7 CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE MEDIATION PRocESS 18 (1986). 
8 Id. at 125-37; see also Stuart H. Bompey & Gazy R. Siniscalco, The Setllernenl Process 
in Employment Discrimination Litigation: A New Perspective, in LmGATING EMPLOYMD.T 
DISCRIMINATION CASES 329 (PL! Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. H-
522, 1995) (noting that mediators are skilled at separating emotional issues from substantive 
issues and that allowing both parties to ventilate their feelings oft.en frees parties to deal 
with substantive issues in dispute). 
9 MOORE, supra note 7, at 103-05. 
io Id. 
11 Id.; JAY FOLBERG & ALisoN TAYLOR, MEDIATION 55 (1984). 
12 Lon Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functums, 44 S. CAL. L. REY. 305, 318 (1971). 
13 MOORE, supra note 7, at 124. 
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III. OVERVIEW OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 banned disability discrimination 
by the federal government, government contractors, and recipients 
of federal funds. 14 That statute left much disability discrimination 
untouched by federal law. Congress determined that additional 
federal legislation was necessary to eliminate discrimination 
against the estimated forty-three million Americans with disabili-
ties15 and, with passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 
extended the federal prohibition against disability discrimination 
to large segments of the population previously unprotected. Much 
of the ADA's language is based on the Rehabilitation Act and its 
regulations. 
The ADA defines a disability as "a physical or mental impair-
ment that substantially limits one or more of the [individual's] 
major life activities .... "16 Major life activities are those that the 
average person can perform with little or no difficulty, including 
walking, seeing, hearing, breathing, learning, working, caring for 
oneself, and participating in community activities.17 Moreover, 
individuals who have a history of disability or who are perceived to 
have a disability, even if they do not, also meet the statutory 
definition of disability.18 
The ADA contains five titles: Title I addresses discrimination in 
employment; Title II covers discrimination in public services; Title 
III covers discrimination in public accommodations; and Title IV 
addresses telecommunications services for individuals with hearing 
and speech impairments. Title V contains several miscellaneous 
14 29 u.s.c. §§ 791, 793-95 (1988). 
15 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (Supp. V 1993). 
16 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2Xa). While the term physical or mental impairment is not defined 
in the statute, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has recently issued 
extensive guidelines identifying those conditions that do qualify as disabilities, those that 
may qualify, and those that do not. 2 EEOC COMPLIANCE MANuAL § 902 (1995). Moreover, 
the statute expressly eliminates certain conditions from the definition of disability, including 
homosexuality, bisexuality, compulsive gambling, kleptomania, pyromania, disorders 
resulting from current illegal drug use, "transvestism, transsexualism, pedophilia, 
exhibitionism, voyeurism, [and] gender identity disorders not resulting from physical 
impairments or other sexual behavior disorders.n 42 U.S.C. § 12211. 
17 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1995). 
18 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2XB)-(C). 
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provisions, notably sections 506 and 513. Section 506 requires the 
agencies primarily responsible for administration of the ADA to 
provide technical assistance to covered entities, individuals with 
rights under the statute, and other federal agencies.19 Section 513 
encourages the use of alternative dispute resolution where 
appropriate and authorized by law.20 
A. TITLE I-EMPLOYMENT 
The employment provisions of the ADA apply to employers with 
fifteen or more employees.21 Title I prohibits discrimination 
against "a qualified individual with a disability because of the 
disability ... in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, 
advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, 
job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employ-
ment."22 Title I involves three key issues: (1) what constitutes a 
disability; (2) who is a qualified individual with a disability; and (3) 
what is discrimination. 
The definition of "disability" applies equally to all titles under the 
ADA. 23 With respect to the second issue, an individual must 
establish that she is a qualified individual with a disability, that is, 
with or without reasonable accommodation she can perform the 
essential functions of the job. 24 "Essential functions" of the job 
and "reasonable accommodation" are both terms of art under the 
Act. Essential functions are those that are fundamental rather 
than marginal25 and are determined by the employer's judgment, 
written job descriptions, the amount of time spent on the function, 
the experience of employees in the same or similar jobs, the terms 
of any collective bargaining agreement, and the consequences of not 
requiring the employee to perform the functions.26 
19 Id. § 12206. 
20 Id. § 12212. 
21 Id. § 12111(5)(A). 
22 Id. § 12112(a). 
23 See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text (discussing definition or disnbility). 
24 Id. § 12111(8). 
25 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n) (1995). 
28 Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). 
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Reasonable accommodation is a critical aspect of the ADA. 
Unlike most civil rights statutes, which require only equal treat-
ment of similarly situated persons, the ADA mandates an affirma-
tive employer effort to assist individuals with disabilities in their 
efforts to work. The statute specifies a nonexclusive list of 
reasonable accommodations, including making facilities accessible, 
restructuring jobs, modifying work schedules, reassigning employ-
ees to vacant positions, acquiring or modifying equipment or 
devices, and providing readers or interpreters.27 An employer 
must make reasonable accommodations that enable the employee 
to perform the job unless they create an undue hardship on the 
employer.28 The employer may establish undue hardship by 
demonstrating that making the accommodation would require 
significant difficulty or expense.29 
Title I prohibits various forms of discrimination, including 
intentional discrimination; the use of standards, criteria, methods 
of administration, or tests that have the effect of discrimination; 
participation in a relationship that causes employees or applicants 
to be subjected to discrimination; discrimination based on an 
employee's or applicant's relationship with an individual with a 
disability; and failure to reasonably accommodate a qualified 
individual with a disability.30 The Title provides several defenses 
to a claim of discrimination in addition to undue hardship. An 
employer may justify the use of its job qualifications, selection 
criteria, or tests that have a discriminatory impact by establishing 
that they are job related and consistent with business necessity.31 
It may exclude individuals who pose a direct threat to the health 
or safety of others in the workplace.32 Finally, an employer may 
challenge a claim on the grounds that an individual is not disabled, 
is not qualified for the position, or was not discriminated against 
on the basis of the disability. 
In addition to its other prohibitions, the ADA directly limits both 
inquiries about disability and medical examinations. An employer 
may inquire into an applicant's ability to perform the job, but not 
27 42 u.s.c. § 12111(9). 
28 Id. § 12112(b)(5XA). 
29 Id. § 12111(10XA). 
a-0 Id. § 12112. 
31 Id. § 12113(a). 
32 Id. § 12113(b). 
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into the applicant's disability.33 Moreover, the employer can 
require an applicant to take a medical exam only after an offer of 
employment is made.34 The offer may be conditioned on the 
results of the exam only if all new employees in the same job 
category are subjected to the exam, the medical information is kept 
confidential, and any disqualification resulting from the exam is 
based on criteria that are job related and consistent with business 
necessity. 35 Similarly, an employer may make such inquiries of 
or require medical exams from employees only if the inquiries or 
exams are "job related and consistent with business necessity."35 
Title I adopts the enforcement mechanisms of Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964.37 Accordingly, exhaustion of administra-
tive remedies is a prerequisite to filing a suit alleging a Title I 
violation. A complainant must file a charge with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which investigates 
to determine "whether there is reasonable cause to believe that the 
charge is true."38 If so, the EEOC is required to "endeavor to 
eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment practice by 
informal methods of conference, conciliation and persuasion."39 If 
conciliation efforts fail, the EEOC may file suit40 or may decline to 
do so and will notify the complainant of its determination.41 
Regardless of whether the EEOC finds reasonable cause, the 
complainant may file a judicial action within ninety days from 
receipt of the EEOC's notice of the right to sue.42 Pursuant to its 
enforcement authority, the EEOC has issued regulations to carry 
out Title I. 43 
33 Id. § 12112(c){2). The EEOC has issued administrative guidnnce regarding pre-
employment exams and inquiries. See EEOC Guidance on Pre-employment Inquiries Under 
the Americans with Disabilities Act, DAILY LAB. REP., Oct. 11, 1995, at E-4. 
34 42 U.S.C. § 12112(c). 
35 Id. § 12112(c){3). 
35 Id.§ 12112(c){4){A). 
37 Id. § 12117(a). 
33 42 u.s.c. § 2000e-5 (1988). 
39 Id. 
40 In the case of a governmental respondent, the EEOC must refer the case to the 
Attorney General for filing of the civil suit. Id. 
41 Conciliation is a prerequisite to a suit filed by the Commission or Attorney General, 
but a suit by the charging party is not barred by the EEOC's failure to conciliate. :MACK A. 
PLAYER ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 729 (1995). 
42 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(0. 
43 42 U.S.C. § 12116; 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.1-1630.16 (1995). 
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B. TITLE II-PUBLIC ENTITIES 
Title II of the ADA proscribes discrimination by public entities 
against qualified individuals with disabilities. Public entities 
include state and local governments; departments, agencies, special 
purpose districts or other "instrumentalit[ies] of a State or States 
or local government[s]"; and passenger railroads.44 In addition to 
a broad prohibition against discrimination, Title II specifies that 
qualified individuals with disabilities cannot "be excluded from 
participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs 
or activities of a public entity."45 Employment discrimination 
actions against public entities may be brought under either Title I 
or Title 11.46 Title II adopts the enforcement procedures of section 
505 of the Rehabilitation Act.47 The Department of Justice is 
authorized to file suits for enforcement of Title II.48 As with Title 
I, individuals with disabilities have a private right of action under 
Title II; however, such individuals need not exhaust federal 
administrative remedies as a prerequisite to suit.49 
Should an individual choose to file a complaint, investigation is 
handled by one of a variety of agencies designated in the regula-
tions. 50 All complaints must be filed within 180 days from the 
44 42 U.S.C. § 12131 (Supp. V 1993). 
45 Id. § 12132. 
46 28 C.F.R. § 35.140 (1995); Petersen v. University of Wis., 818 F. Supp. 1276, 1278-79 
(W.D. Wis. 1993). Title Il further contains detailed requirements that public transportation 
systems must meet to avoid a violation of the Act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12141-12150, 12161-12165. 
47 42 U.S.C. § 12133. The Act's legislative history indicates that enforcement should 
follow the model established under§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. H.R. REP. No. 485, lOlst 
Cong., 2d Sess. 98 (1990). Section 505 contains enforcement procedures for both § 504 
actions and § 501 actions. 29 U.S.C. § 794a (1994). Section 501 covers employees of the 
federal government. Id. § 791. 
48 H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 47, at 98. 
49 Id. 
50 See 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.170-35.178, 35.190 (1995) (containing complaint procedure and 
designating appropriate agencies for filing of complaints). The Department ofTransportation 
handles complaints relating to transportation, including highways, public transportation, 
traffic management, automobile licensing and inspection, and driver licensing. Id. 
§ 35.190(bX8). The Agency's authority as an investigating agency under the regulations is 
identical to that of the other seven designated agencies and is distinct from its regulatory 
and enforcement responsibility under Title II, Part B, which deals with public transportation 
by public entities. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12141-12161. The other investigating agencies are the 
Departments of Agriculture, Education, Health and Human Services, Housing and Urban 
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date of the alleged discrimination.51 The appropriate agency must 
investigate the complaint and attempt informal resolution.62 Ifno 
resolution is reached, a Letter of Findings is issued to both the 
complainant and the public entity. When the agency finds 
noncompliance with the statute, it will attempt to negotiate an 
agreement for voluntary compliance.53 If no agreement is reached, 
the case is referred to the Attorney General for "appropriate 
action. "54 
If the public entity receives federal funds (as most do), it is also 
susceptible to termination and suspension of funding under section 
504 of the Rehabilitation Act.55 Prior to termination or suspen-
sion of funding, however, the entity is entitled to a hearing.58 
Both the Secretary of Transportation and the Attorney General 
have issued regulations pursuant to Title II.57 
C. TITLE III-PUBLIC ACCOMI\IODATIONS 
Title III of the ADA bans discrimination in any public accommo-
dation affecting commerce.58 Public accommodation is defined 
Development, Interior, and Labor. 28 C.F.R. § 35.190. 
51 28 C.F.R. § 35.170{b). 
52 Id.§ 35.172. 
53 Id. § 35.173. 
54 Id.§ 35.174. 
55 29 U.S.C. § 794(a){2) (1994). 
56 See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 41.5 (1995) (requiring each enforcement agency under Rehabilita-
tion Act to establish system including enforcement and hearing procedures adopted for Tille 
VI); 34 C.F.R. § 100.8 (1995) (setting forth Department of Education regulations requiring 
hearing under Tille VI); 49 C.F.R. §§ 27.125, 27.127 (1995) (setting forth Department of 
Transportation regulations requiring hearing under Rehabilitation Act). 
57 The Secretary of Transportation has the authority to issue regulations to carry out the 
sections of Title II dealing with public transportation by public entities. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12149, 
12164; see also 49 C.F.R. §§ 37.1-37.169, 38.1-38.179 (setting forth Department of 
Transportation regulations implementing Titles II and ID of ADA). The regulations must 
be consistent with accessibility guidelines promulgated by the Architectural and Transporta-
tion Barriers Compliance Board in accordance with Title V, § 504 of the ADA.. 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 12149(b), 12163, 12204. The Attorney General has the authority to issue regulations to 
carry out the remainder of Title II. Id. § 12134; see also 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.101-35.190 (setting 
forth Department of Justice regulations). The ADA requires the regulations to be consistent 
with those issued pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act § 504. 42 U.S.C. § 12134(b)-(c). 
5S 42 u.s.c. §§ 12181(7), 12182(a). Title nrs new construction and alterations provisions, 
see infra note 65 and accompanying text, apply to commercial facilities as well as places of 
public accommodation. Id. § 12183. Commercial facilities nre those intended for 
nonresidential use whose operations affect commerce. Id. § 12181(2). 
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quite broadly and includes restaurants, hotels, theaters, retail 
establishments, auditoriums, schools, museums, libraries, public 
transportation stations, service establishments, social service 
agencies, and recreational establishments.69 A public accommoda-
tion, including the owner, lessor, lessee, or operator, cannot 
discriminate by denying persons with disabilities the "full and 
equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, 
advantages, or accommodations. "60 
Title III requires both access to an establishment and to services 
and facilities in an integrated setting.61 The Title mandates that 
a public accommodation modify its practices and procedures to 
ensure access for individuals with disabilities unless the changes 
would fundamentally alter the nature of the services or facilities.62 
A public accommodation must remove architectural and commu-
nication barriers where removal is "readily achievable," defined as 
"easily accomplishable and able to be carried out without much 
difficulty or expense. "63 Otherwise, access to the services or 
facility must be made available through readily achievable 
alternative means.64 Additionally, Title III imposes specific 
accessibility guidelines for newly constructed facilities and existing 
facilities which undergo substantial alterations. 66 
69 Id. § 12181(7). 
60 Id. § 12182. As with Title I, Title III prohibits discrimination against persons based 
on their association with an individual with a disability. Id. § 12182(bX1XE). 
61 See id. § 12182(bX2XAXiv) (requiring removal of architectural barriers); id. 
§ 12182(b)(l)(B) (requiring that goods and services be provided in most integrated settings 
appropriate to individual's needs). 
62 Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii). Moreover, disabled persons cannot be denied services because 
of the absence of "auxiliary aids or services," such as interpreters, readers, or other devices 
that would enable communication with the hearing or visually impaired, unless the use of 
such aids would fundamentally alter the nature of the services or would impose an undue 
burden on the accommodation. Id. §§ 12182(bX2XAXiii), 12102(1). Additionally, a public 
accommodation cannot use eligibility criteria that bar disabled individuals from full and 
equal enjoyment of goods, services, or facilities unless such criteria are necessary to the 
provision of the goods, services, or facilities. Id. § 12182(2)(A)(i). 
63 Id.§§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv), 12181(9). Readily achievable alterations include, for example, 
small ramps, raised-letter and braille markings on signs and elevator controls, grab bars, 
flashing alarm lights, and telephones placed at a lower height. S. REP. No. 116, supra note 
16, at 66. 
64 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(v). 
66 Id. §§ 12183(a)(l)-(2). Title III contains additional provisions specifically directed at 
public transportation supplied by private entities. Id. §§ 12182(b)(2XB)-(D), 12184. 
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Private claimants under Title m can sue only for injunctive 
relief, 66 and they are not required to exhaust administrative 
remedies. Possible injunctive relief includes orders to alter 
facilities, to provide auxiliary aids, to modify policies, or to provide 
services or goods by alternative methods.67 Title m authorizes 
the Attorney General to file a civil action when discrimination 
raises an issue of "general public importance" or when reasonable 
cause exists to believe that a person "is engaged in a pattern or 
practice of discrim.ination."68 Unlike private actions, compensato-
ry damages and civil penalties are available in cases brought by the 
Attorney General. 69 The Attorney General is responsible for 
investigating alleged violations of Title m and conducting periodic 
compliance reviews 70 and has issued regulations under the 
Title.71 
D. TITLE IV-TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
Title IV amends the Federal Communications Act to make 
communication by wire or radio available to individuals \vith a 
66 Id. § 12188{a}. 
'"Id. 
68 Id. § 12188{bXl}(B}. 
69 Id. § 12188(bX2}. 
70 Id. § 12188(bXl}{A}(i}. While the statutory language states that the Attorney General 
"shall investigate" alleged violations of Title ill, id., the Department of Justice has taken the 
position that, unlike Title II claims, investigation of Title ill cases is discretionary. Meeting 
with representatives of the Department of Justice, Disability Rights Section (?.fur. 28, 1994). 
Also, after public hearing and in consultation with the Architectural and Transportation 
Barriers Compliance Board, the Attorney General is authorized to certify that state laws, 
local building codes, or other ordinances establishing accessibility mllildntes meet Title ill's 
requirements. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(b)(l)(A)(ii). Evidence of compliance with a certified law 
provides rebuttable evidence of compliance with the Act. Id. 
Effective March 1, 1995, the ADA functions of the Department of Justice were reorgnnized 
and centralized into the Disability Rights Section. Letter from John L. Wodntch, Chief, 
Public Access Section, Civil Rights Division, Department of Justice (Feb. 22, 1995) 
[hereinafter Letter from John L. Wodatch] (on file with author); Telephone Interview with 
Eve Hill, Attorney, Disability Rights Section, Department of Justice (?.far. 9, 1995). 
Accordingly, further reference in the Article will be to the Disability Rights Section. 
71 42 U.S.C. § 12186(b); see also 28 C.F.R §§ 36.101-36.608 (1995) (setting forth 
regulations promulgated by Attorney General). Regulations for the transportation provisions 
of Title ill were issued by the Secretary of Transportation. 42 U.S.C. § 12186(11); see also 49 
C.F.R §§ 37.1-37.179, 38.1-38.179 (setting forth regulations issued by Secretary of 
Transportation}. 
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speech or hearing impairment in a manner "functionally equivalent 
to the ability of an individual who does not have a hearing 
impairment or speech impairment. "72 Congress authorized the 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to use its enforcement 
authority under the Communications Act to ensure that both 
interstate and intrastate communication services were available 
within three years of enactment of Title IV.73 Pursuant to this 
authority, the FCC mandated that "[e]ach common carrier provid-
ing telephone voice transmission services" provide telecommunica-
tions relay services for intrastate and interstate communications. 74 
The FCC has issued regulations to ensure compliance with Title 
IV's requirements.75 Complaints alleging violation of Title IV are 
filed with the FCC or with a certified state program-if the 
violation involves intrastate services.76 The FCC must resolve 
complaints by final order within 180 days of filing.77 
IV. DISPUTE RESOLUTION UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH 
DISABILITIES ACT 
A. TITLE I 
The EEOC has faced an increasing backlog of cases, reaching 
108,106 cases as of mid-1995.78 That the ADA was enacted 
without any corresponding increase in EEOC staff only exacerbated 
the backlog. 79 In fact, the number of investigators decreased 
during the years 1990 to 1994, resulting in an increase in the 
average investigator caseload from 51 cases to 122 cases during 
72 47 U.S.C. §§ 225(aX3), 225(b) (Supp. V 1993). 
73 Id. § 225(b). 
74 47 C.F.R. § 64.603 (1995). These services must be provided at rates no greater than 
those paid for comparable voice communication services. Id. § 64.604. 
75 47 U.S.C. § 225(d); 47 C.F.R. §§ 64.601-64.608. 
76 47 C.F.R. § 64.604(c)(5). The FCC is authorized to certify state compliance programs 
meeting the requirements for federal certification. 47 U.S.C. § 225(0. 
77 47 U.S.C. § 225(e). If a state does not timely resolve a complaint, jurisdiction reverts 
to the FCC. 47 C.F.R. § 47.604(cX5). 
78 Statement of EEOC Chairman Casellas Before Senate Labor and Human Resources 
Committee May 23, 1995, DAILY LAB. REP., May 24, 1995, at E-6. 
79 Id. 
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that period.80 Not surprisingly, the average time to process a 
charge grew from 284 days to 328 days over that span, 81 resulting 
in great frustration among parties dealing with the Agency. 82 
Immense caseloads and inability to achieve prompt case resolution 
also frustrate Agency personnel. 83 Despite the increasing backlog, 
increased funding for the Agency seems unlikely.84 
Although the complaining party must file a charge with the 
EEOC, he or she may ask the EEOC to issue a right-to-sue notice 
if 180 days have passed since the filing of the charge, regardless of 
the status of the investigation.85 Less-sophisticated individuals, 
8fJ Id. 
s1 Id. 
82 See EEOC Official and Attorneys Discuss Challenges Posed by Record Charge Rate, 
DAILY LAB. REP., Mar. 22, 1994, at A-13 (expressing concern over growing caseload); Letter 
from Jeffrey A. Nonis, Equal Employment Advisory Council, to Frances ll.L Ho.rt. Executive 
Officer, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 2 (Sept. 16, 1993) (on file with author) 
(expressing concern over impossible task created for EEOC by burgeoning cruieload). 
83 See EEOC Official Discusses Record Charge Rote, 145 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 112, 
at 381 (Mar. 28, 1994) (discussing Agency frustration over caseload); Latest EEOC Data 
Show Record Charges, Sharp Increase in Inventory of Pending Cases, DAILY LAB. REP., Aug. 
10, 1993, at A-2 (noting although Agency increased its resolution of charges in 1993, number 
of charges awaiting resolution increased by nearly 32%, generating significant Agency 
concern). 
84 Although President Clinton requested a 15% increase in the EEOC's 1996 budget, it 
is unlikely that the request will survive the congressional budget process. EEOC: 
Substantial Increase in EEOC Budget is Unlikely ta Survive GOP Congress, DAILY LAB. REP., 
Feb. 7, 1995, at B-2. Following the EEOC's adoption of backlog-reducing measures, see infra 
notes 113-125 and accompanying te.xt, Representative Fawell stated during congressional 
hearings that "he hoped that the [EEOC's] funds [would] not be cut but warned that any 
substantial increase in [the] budget [was] unlikely.• House Panel Elicits Detail.son Changes 
Under Way at EEOC, DAILY LAB. REP., May 24, 1995, at A·9. 
The EEOC received virtually no increase in funding or staffing when ADA cases were 
added to its enforcement responsibilities, yet ADA cases now constitute about 20% of the 
Agency's caseload. David R. Sands, Charges of Bias on the Job Rising Fast, WASH. TIMES, 
Apr. 2, 1994, at D5; EEOC Must Begin ta Deal with its Growing Workload, 143 Lab. Rel. Rep. 
(BNA) No. 16, at 495 (Aug. 16, 1993). Despite the additional workload generated by the ADA 
and the Civil Rights Act of1991, the EEOC has 559 fewer staifmembera than it had in 1980. 
EEOC, Civil Rights Commission Chiefs Make Case ta Congress For Budget Increases, DAILY 
LAB. REP., Mar. 25, 1994, at A-17. As of this Article, the EEOC was operating under a 
continuing resolution allowing the Agency to operate at the same level of spending 
authorized in fiscal year 1995. Telephone interview with Kassie A. Billingsley, Director of 
Fin. and Resource Management, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (Oct. 9, 1995). 
85 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(0 (1988); 29 C.F.R. § 160L28 (1995). If the Agency determines its 
investigation will not be completed within 180 days, the complainant may request and 
receive a right-to-sue letter before 180 days have passed. See House Panel Elicits Details on 
Changes Under Way at EEOC, supra note 84, at A·9. 
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individuals without lawyers, 86 and those hoping for Agency 
litigation of the charge are unaided by this provision, however. 
Moreover, the congressional goal of encouraging informal resolution 
of charges through the conciliation process is frustrated.87 
In part because of the tremendous backlog, the number of cases 
litigated under Title I of the ADA has been extremely small relative 
to the number of charges filed: From July 26, 1992 (the Act's 
effective date) through the end of 1994, 39,927 charges were 
filed,88 yet the EEOC filed only 48 court cases alleging ADA 
violations. 89 In addition, some private litigants have filed suit. Of 
the 154 ADA cases published from 1993 through mid-1994,90 58 
were Title I cases.91 Additionally, the EEOC settled nearly ten 
percent of the approximately 50,000 ADA charges filed through 
June 30, 1995.92 Despite the number of cases settled and the 
expected increase in litigated cases, these figures dramatically 
illustrate the significance of the backlog and demonstrate that the 
availability of a private right of action is not reducing the backlog. 
Meanwhile, the number of ADA charges filed is expected to 
increase: it is anticipated that 32,000 charges will be filed in fiscal 
year 1996 alone. 93 Thus, the overwhelming majority of ADA 
86 See House Panel Elicits Details on Changes Under Way at EEOC, supra note 84, at A·9 
(indicating that although EEOC notifies individuals represented by counsel of right to 
request right-to-sue letter when investigation will not be completed within 180 days, letter 
is of little benefit to parties without legal representation). 
87 See Departing EEOC General Counsel Sees Need for New Direction at Overwhelmed 
Agency, DAILY LAB. REP., June 11, 1993, at AA-1 (noting backlog of charges and failure to 
fund Agency provisions for voluntary dispute resolution have intensified problems in 
administering Title VII). 
88 Telephone Interview with Peggy Mastroianni, Director of ADA Policy, Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (Jan. 23, 1995). 
s9 Id. 
90 As published in the ADA Cases (BNA) Reporter. 
91 ADA: Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 Special Report, 146 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 
No. 14, at 8 (Aug. 1, 1994). Because the BNA data include all cases, there is some overlap 
between the 48 EEOC cases and the 58 cases in the BNA data. 
92 Disabilities Act: Disabilities Law Viewed Positively but Also as Cause of Frivolous 
Suits, DAILY LAB. REP., July 27, 1995, at A-8. Over 10,000 additional cases were closed 
administratively, including those in which a requested right-to-sue letter was issued prior 
to completion of an investigation. Id. After full investigation, the EEOC found merit in 822 
cases. Id. 
93 EEOC: Substantial Increase in EEOC Budget is Unlikely to Survive GOP Congress, 
supra note 84, at B-2. 
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employment cases are simply awaiting investigatory action and few 
of them will ever be litigated by the Agency regardless of the 
investigation's outcome, a situation not expected to change in the 
foreseeable future. 
Consideration of how to resolve the EEO C's tremendous backlog 
problem is ongoing. Proposals have included changes in the 
Agency's structure, its priorities, its funding, and its dispute 
resolution mechanisms. 94 This consideration has not been limited 
to ADA cases but instead relates to all of the Agency's statutory 
responsibilities. 
Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) is one potential weapon for 
attacking the backlog and preventing its growth. Recognizing this, 
the EEOC has begun to experiment with ADR.95 For many years 
the Agency has attempted to settle cases through negotiation 
whenever possible. 96 In cases in which it finds reasonable cause, 
the EEOC is statutorily required to conciliate prior to litigation.97 
Unfortunately, these efforts have been insufficient to prevent 
continuing growth of the backlog. 
In an initial effort to promote the use of ADR in ADA cases, the 
94 See EEOC Chair to Address Agency Problems, 147 Lab. Rel. Rep. CBNA) No. 13, at 404 
(Nov. 28, 1994) (discussing ideas of new EEOC Chair to improve effectiveness nnd efficiency 
of Agency); Owens Holds Hearing on Reforming EEOC Organizational Structure and 
Enforcement Autlwrity, Subcommittee on Select Education and Civil Rights, House of 
Representatives, 1994 WL 386268 (F.D.C.H.) (July 26, 1994) [hereinafter 011eroight Hearing] 
(discussing various proposals to improve effectiveness of EEOC); Senate Hearing Eyes EEOC 
Reforms, Backlog, 149 Lab. Rel. Rep. CBNA) No. 5, at 154 (May 29, 1995) (discussing 
proposed reforms to relieve Agency backlog); Government Reorganization: Reich, Casellas 
Oppose Merging Labor, Education, EEOC; GOP Vows to Mo11e Ahead, DAILY LAB. REP., July 
26, 1995, at AA-1 (discussing proposal to merge EEOC with Departments of Labor nnd 
Education); see also Fact Finding Report Issued by the Commission on the Future of Worker-
Management Relations, DAILY LAB. REP., June 3, 1994 (special supp.) (discussing current 
system of employment regulation, litigation, and dispute resolution; nnd considering 
alternative methods of handling employment-related disputes, including alternative dispute 
resolution, unified administrative agency, and unified labor court). 
95 In July 1993, the EEOC requested comments from the public concerning its intent to 
develop a policy statement regarding the use of alternative dispute resolution. EEOC 
Request for Comments on Alternative Dispute Resolution, DAILY LAB. REP., July 15, 1993, at 
G-1. The comments received generally reflected support for ADR, although mo.ny expressed 
reservations with respect to the particular uses or methods of implementation of ADR. A 
copy of the comments is on file with the author. 
96 See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.20 (1995) (authorizing EEOC to encourage settlement nnd 
establishing procedures to be followed in event of settlement). 
97 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1988). 
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EEOC and the Department of Justice funded training in both the 
ADA and ADR for individuals with disabilities. 98 As a result of 
the training, twenty-five individuals were certified as trained 
mediators. In 1994, the EEOC completed a pilot mediation 
program in which 267 of a contemplated 300 mediations were 
conducted. 99 The program included Title I ADA cases, but was 
limited to cases involving discharge, discipline, or alleged discrimi-
nation in terms and conditions of employment.100 Although 
reasonable accommodation cases seem appropriate for mediation, 
the pilot project did not include them. 101 
The Agency contracted with the Center for Dispute Settlement to 
conduct mediation upon agreement of both parties.102 A mediator 
unconnected to the Agency was assigned a case for sixty days.103 
While 87% of the charging parties opted for mediation, only 43% of 
98 Information regarding these training sessions was obtained from representatives of the 
EEOC; the Department of Justice, Disability Rights Section; and the Disability Rights 
Education and Defense Fund (DREDF). See also ABA COMM'N ON MENTAL AND PHYSICAL 
DISABILITY LAW AND COMM'N ON LEGAL PROBLEMS OF ELDERLY, TARGETING DISABILITY 
NEEDS: A GUIDE TO THE AMERICANS WlTH DISABILITIES ACT FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
PROGRAMS 9 (American Ass'n of Retired Persons for Nat'l Inst. for Disp. Resol., 1994) 
[hereinafter TARGETING DISABILITY NEEDS] (discussing training); Request for Comments on 
the Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution and Negotiated Rulemaking Procedures, 58 Fed. 
Reg. 39,023 (EEOC 1993) (same). 
99 EEOC, Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Pilot Program 1-3 (1994) [hereinafter 
EEOC Report onADR Pilot Program]; EEOC Official Discusses Record Charge Rate, 145 Lab. 
Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 12, at 381 (Mar. 28, 1994). 
100 See EEOC Report on ADR Pilot Program, supra note 99, at 2. Fourteen percent of tho 
total cases entering the pilot project for assignment to mediation or the control group wore 
disability cases. Craig A. McEwen, An Evaluation of the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission's Pilot Mediation Program 21 (Mar. 1994) (Center for Disp. Settlement) 
[hereinafter EEOC Mediation Program Evaluation]. 
101 See EEOC Report on ADR Pilot Program, supra note 99, at 2. The EEOC decided to 
exclude reasonable accommodation cases for several reasons. First, the Agency had a strong 
interest in reducing the backlog of discharge cases, its largest category. Second, the Agency 
had limited experience with reasonable accommodation issues under the other statutes it 
administers, and Congress indicated it did not intend for the interpretation of Title VII's 
requirement ofreasonable accommodation for religion, see Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 
432 U.S. 81 (1977), to govern the ADA. H.R. REP. No. 485, supra note 47, at 68; S. REP. No. 
116, supra note 16, at 36. Finally, the ADA was a new statute without existing precedent 
regarding remedies. Given these factors, there was concern for setting a settlement standard 
in reasonable accommodation cases through outside mediation. Information from 
Representatives of EEOC and of the Center for Dispute Settlement. 
102 EEOC Report on ADR Pilot Program, supra note 99, at 1-2. 
103 EEOC Official Discusses Record Charge Rate, supra note 99, at 381. 
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employers agreed to mediate. 104 Employers were particularly 
reluctant to mediate discharge cases perhaps because they saw no 
ground for compromise.105 Settlement was reached in 52% of the 
mediated cases.106 
The parties to mediation in the pilot project reflected generally 
high satisfaction levels: 92% believed the mediation was fair and 
80% would try it again.107 Reviews by the Agency's supervisory 
personnel were mixed. Some were concerned that mediation would 
weaken the Agency's law-enforcement image; others felt that 
mediation added time to case processing.108 While the mediation 
process took far less time than a full investigation, 109 cases that 
were not settled moved back into the investigation process, perhaps 
adding to overall processing time.110 A comparison of mediated 
settlement agreements with those reached through normal Agency 
resolution techniques found no major differences in the remedies, 
although plaintiffs received slightly higher monetary payments in 
Agency-settled cases.111 However, when mediators believed that 
1°' EEOC Report on ADR Pilot Program, supra note 99, at 3. 
105 Information from Representatives of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. 
The final report indicated that only 39% of employers agreed to medinte in the cases when 
the employee was terminated, and 48% agreed when the employee remnined employed, yet 
70% agreed when the employee had resigned. EEOC Report on ADR Pilot Program, supra 
note 99, at 4. 
106 EEOC Report on ADR Pilot Program, supra note 99, at 4. 
107 Id. at 5. One fairness concern was expressed by both sides: When either party 
appeared with unexpected representatives, its good fnith was questioned. Id. 
108 Id. at 6-7. A further concern addressed the avnilnbility of resources for expanded or 
continued use of mediation. Id. at 7-8. 
109 The average time for completion of the mediation process was 67 dnys, id. at 4, while 
in 1994 the average processing time for cases outside the mediation project wns 293 days. 
EEOC Struggles with Caseload, 45 LAB. L.J. 432 (1994). 
110 Supervisors believed that the pilot project added time to the process. EEOC Report 
on ADR Pilot Program, supra note 99, at 6. The report did not recite dntn enabling any 
definitive conclusion on the issue, however. The difl'erence in resolution time between 
mediated and non-mediated cases may be at least partly attributable to the fnct that while 
mediated cases were immediately processed, settlement negotiations outside the pilot project 
"proceeded in accordance with docket order scheduling: Id. at 6. 
m Id. at 6. Note, however, that earlier settlement in mediation results inn lower amount 
of lost wages and benefits. EEOC Mediation Program Evaluation, supra note 100, at 52. 
Furthermore, many of the mediation-eligible cases that continued in the EEOC process 
displayed greater potential for a finding of discrimination, according to the mediators' 
evaluations. Id. at 53. Finally, the number of merit resolutions-resolutions that result in 
some benefit for the charging party-was increased by mediation. Id. nt 54-55. In addition 
to financial settlements and promised changes in job status, 21 % of the mediated settlements 
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discrimination had occurred, few settlements were reached.112 
In December 1994, newly-appointed EEOC Chair Gilbert Casellas 
announced formation of an ADR Task Force to study and recom-
mend to the Commission appropriate uses of ADR.113 The task 
force report led to the adoption of four ADR-related motions.114 
The first motion directed the Chair to take actions necessary to 
develop an ADR program with the following elements: (1) informed 
and voluntary participation; (2) confidential deliberations in the 
ADR process; and (3) the use of neutral facilitators.116 The 
motion directed the EEOC's Office of Legal Counsel to draft a 
proposed policy statement on ADR by May 30, 1995, reflecting the 
"basic principles and conclusions of the ADR Task Force Report: 
that ADR furthers the EEOC's dual mission of vigorously enforcing 
federal laws prohibiting employment discrimination and resolving 
employment discrimination disputes. "116 Upon approval of the 
policy statement, the Commission Chair is to request proposals 
from EEOC district offices desiring to participate in the ADR 
program and to select proposals for implementation, giving priority 
to mediation proposals. 117 The target date for implementation is 
fiscal year 1996.118 
While the EEOC also is encouraging internal ADR efforts by 
employers, the Agency's concern over the growing use of employer-
sponsored arbitration is reflected in the fourth motion. It directs 
the EEOC's Legal Counsel to prepare and submit a proposed policy 
statement supporting employer efforts to develop voluntary internal 
ADR programs, while reiterating the Agency's opposition to 
included promises to change management practices and procedures. Id. 
112 EEOC Report on ADR Pilot Program, supra note 99, at 5. While this finding might 
be cause for concern, it may instead suggest that the EEOC's enforcement role is not being 
undermined by mediation. EEOC Mediation Program Evaluation, supra note 100, at 47. 
Charging parties having strong cases are less willing to compromise their claims. Id. at 45. 
113 Report and Recommendations of the Commission on the Future of Worker· Management 
Relations, reprinted in DAILY LAB. REP., Jan. 10, 1995 (special supp.). 
114 Kevin P. McGowan, EEOC Votes to Offer Voluntary Mediation as Option in Job 
Discrimination Claims, DAILY LAB. REP., Apr. 26, 1995, at AA-1. 
115 Motions Proposed by the ADR Task Force, Commission Meeting of the Task Force on 
Alternative Dispute Resolution, Mot. 1 (Apr. 25, 1995) [hereinafter Motions] (on file with 
author). 
116 Id. Mot. 2. 
117 McGowan, supra note 114, at AA-1. 
11s Id. 
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conditioning employment on agreement to mandatory, binding 
arbitration of discrimination disputes and confirming the Agency's 
determination to accept and process charges regardless of a 
preexisting employer-sponsored ADR program.119 
The contemplated EEOC ADR program includes monitoring and 
enforcement by the EEOC and applies broadly to cases within the 
Agency's jurisdiction, including ADA cases.12° Chairman Casellas 
has begun implementation, directing consultation with stakeholders 
regarding program development, efforts to identify pro bono and 
low cost mediators, plans for training agency personnel and outside 
mediators, and development of educational materials.121 Thus, 
the EEOC is now moving rapidly to institute a voluntary ADR 
program.122 
In addition to its ADR recommendations, the EEOC adopted 
other recommendations to improve its charge processing sys-
tem. 123 These recommendations include adopting a more flexible 
approach to charge processing; prioritizing charges based on the 
level of investigation necessary; developing a National Enforcement 
Plan to identify priority issues and guide enforcement; eliminating 
detailed "no cause" letters when no discrimination is found; 
119 Motions, supra note 115, Mot. 4. The EEOC recently acted on its opposition to pre-
offer mandatory agreements to arbitrate, obtaining a preliminary injunction barring an 
employer from requiring its employees to use the employer's ADR Policy. EEOC v. River 
Oaks Imaging & Diagnostic, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. CBNA) 1243 CS.D. Tex. 1995). The 
employer subsequently entered into a consent order making the preliminary injunction 
permanent. Alternatiue Dispute Resolution: EEOC Agrees with Houston Medical Firm on 
Permanent Halt to Mandatory ADR Plan, DAILY LAB. REP., July 3, 1995, at A-2. 
120 McGowan, supra note 114, at AA-1. 
121 See Motions onAlternatiue Dispute Resolution Adopted by EEOCApril25, 1995, DAILY 
LAB. REP., Apr. 26, 1995, at E-1 (discussing actions taken by Chairman Casellns). 
122 The EEOC also has directed consultation with the state and local fair employment 
practice agencies CFEPAs) with whom it has worksharing agreements, seeking to explore 
ways that ADR Task Force recommendations might further the joint EEOC-FEPA mission. 
Motions and Recommendations of EEOC Task Force on State and Local FEP Agencies 
Adopted May 22, 1995, DAILY LAB. REP., May 23, 1995, at E-18. Some state and local 
agencies have begun using mediation already. See, e.g., infra notes 247-252 and accompany-
ing text (describing mediation by Chicago Commission on Human Relations); infra note 253 
and accompanying text (describing mediation by Connecticut Council on Human Rights and 
Opportunities). 
123 News Release: EEOC Commissioners Adopt Task Force Recommendations to 
Strengthen and Streamline Agency Charge Processing Systems l (Apr. 21, 1995) (EEOC) (on 
file with author). 
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encouraging settlement at all stages of the process; and delegating 
to the General Counsel litigation decisions in individual disparate 
treatment cases under Title VII and the ADEA.124 Decisions to 
litigate ADA cases will continue to be made by the Commis-
sion.125 As with the ADR procedures, these changes are designed 
to expedite case processing and to reduce the existing backlog. 
As previously noted, employers are increasingly experimenting 
with ADR programs.126 Internal ADR programs typically incorpo-
rate one or more ADR methods, including open-door policies, 
ombudspersons, factfinding, peer review, negotiation, company or 
outside mediators, and binding arbitration.127 While mandatory, 
binding arbitration of statutory discrimination claims remains 
controversial, 128 mediation has raised far fewer concerns because 
124 Id. 
125 Disabilities Discrimination: ADA Cases Will Still Go to Commission Under Newly 
Adopted EEOC Procedures, DAILY LAB. REP., May 11, 1995, at A-4. 
126 See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., REP. TO CONG. REQUESTERS, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMI· 
NATION: MOST PRIVATE-SECTOR EMPLOYERS USE ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 3, 7 
(July 1995) [hereinafter GAO REPORT) (finding nearly 90% of employers with more than 100 
employees who filed EEO reports in 1992 use at least one ADR method to resolve 
discrimination complaints); see also Howard A. Simon & Yaroslav Sochynsky, In-House 
Mediation of Employment Disputes: ADR for the 1990s, 21 EMPL. REL. L.J. 29, 29 (1995) 
(noting employers traditionally have used neutral external mediators in ADR but are 
increasingly using in-house ADR programs). The Supreme Court's holding in Gilmer u. 
Interstate I Johnson Lane Corp. that an employee was bound to arbitrate his age discrimina-
tion claim where his application for registration as a securities representative contained a 
form arbitration agreement, encouraged the trend toward arbitration of employment 
disputes. 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1990). 
127 See GAO REPORT, supra note 126, at 1-2 (listing ADR approaches commonly used by 
employers). 
128 See Panelists Say No to Mandatory Arbitration, 149 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 16, at 
496-97 (Aug. 14, 1995) (noting both plaintiff and defense attorneys on ABA panel recommend 
rejection of mandatory arbitration). Although Gilmer required arbitration of an age 
discrimination claim, courts have not agreed on whether contractual arbitration provisions 
preclude judicial litigation of ADA claims. Compare Block v. Art Iron, Inc., 866 F. Supp. 380, 
385-86 (N.D. Ind. 1994) (holding employee's ADA claim was not subject to mandatory 
arbitration clause of collective bargaining agreement when clause did not specifically state 
such claims were included) and Bruton v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 147 L.R.R.M. 
2167, 2168-69 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (holding arbitration clause in collective bargaining agreement 
did not preclude statutory ADA claim) with Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 
844 F. Supp. 1103, 1106-07 (W.D. Va. 1994) (holding employee was estopped from bringing 
ADA discrimination claim when alleged discrimination occurred while binding arbitration 
provision of collective bargaining agreement was in effect). Unlike these cases, Gilmer did 
not involve an arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement, and in fact, the Court 
distinguished the case from Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36 (1974), where it had 
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it seeks a mutually agreeable, rather than a mandatorily imposed, 
solution to the dispute. Thus, the use of ooth external and internal 
mediation to resolve employment disputes is growing.129 
B. TITLES II AND ill 
Like the EEOC, the Department of Justice (DOJ) is overwhelmed 
with ADA cases and has only seventy-five staff members to handle 
its ADA enforcement responsibilities under Titles I, II and ID.130 
As of September 1994, the DOJ was the investigating agency for 
nearly one half of the 2902 complaints filed under Title II and had 
opened an investigation in more than one half of the 2796 com-
plaints alleging violations of Title m. 131 Through September 
1994, the Department had resolved 100 Title II cases informally, 22 
cases through formal settlement agreements, and had issued 33 
letters of findings, 4 of which found noncompliance.132 Through 
the same time period, the Department had completed 300 investiga-
tions of Title m cases, 177 resulting in increased accessibility of 
held that an employee was entitled to pursue a judicial action under Title VII despite a prior 
arbitration decision under the collective bargaining agreemenL Gilmer, 500 U.S. nt 33-35. 
In the unionized workplace, arbitration of disability issues was common prior to enactment 
of the ADA and remains common today. E.g., Waterous Co., 100 Lab. Arb. CBNA) 278 (1993) 
(Reynolds, Arb.); Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co., 100 Lab. Arb. CBNA) 393 (1993) (Pelofsky, 
Arb.); Madison Adult Educ. Dist., 100 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 450 (1993) (Johnson, Arb.); Cleveland 
Elec. lliuminating Co., 100 Lab. Arb. CBNA) 1039 (1993) (Lipson, Arb.); Cessna Aircraft Co., 
104 Lab. Arb. CBNA) 985 (1995) (Thornell, Arb.). 
129 See GAO REPORT, supra note 126, at 7 (finding that of employers reporting use of 
ADR, 38.2% used internal mediation and 8.6% used external mediation); cee also Simon & 
Sochynsky, supra note 126, at 33 (noting that many employers have begun to croit in-house 
mediation programs); cf. BARBARA A. PHILUPS, FINDING COMMON GROUND: A FIELD GUIDE 
TO MEDIATION 155-65 (1994) (recommending mediation of employment disputes); Bompey & 
Siniscalco, supra note 8, at 398 (same); Robert B. Fitzpatrick, Nonbinding Mediation of 
Employment Disputes, TRIAL, June 1994, at 40 (same). 
130 Meeting with Representatives, Department of Justice, Disability Rights Section (Mar. 
28, 1994). President Clinton's 1995 budget provides for 21 additional staff members. The 
scope of the DO.J's responsibilities is immense: approximately 30,000 governmental bodies 
are covered by Title II alone. Id. 
131 Information from Department of Justice, Disability Rights Section. In fiscal year 1995, 
approximately 800 additional Title II and 800 additional Title ill complaints were filed with 
theDOJ. Id. 
m Id. 
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the public accommodation.133 Through mid-1994, 37 Title II and 
25 Title III judicial decisions were published.134 
As previously noted, individuals are not required to exhaust 
administrative remedies under these Titles; thus, any investigatory 
delays caused by a case backlog do not preclude a complaining 
party from filing suit. Nevertheless, when parties wait long periods 
of time for agency action, even when not required to do so, the 
effectiveness of the statute is reduced. Moreover, respondents are 
not relieved of the threat of litigation when cases are not meritori-
ous, nor is rapid resolution of meritorious cases achieved. Further-
more, individuals who do not have the resources to undertake 
private actions are injured by the delay. Finally, a claimant under 
Title III may forego the opportunity for compensatory damages if 
she initiates a private action and the DOJ decides to allocate its 
resources to other cases.135 
As with the EEOC, the DOJ attempts to settle cases informally 
through negotiation. The Department has funded a pilot mediation 
project through a grant to the Community Board Program in San 
Francisco.136 The project utilizes private mediators trained in 
ADA mediation in five targeted cities and anticipates mediation of 
200 cases.137 Cases are referred to the mediators by the DOJ 
upon agreement of the parties. Upon completion of the project, the 
contractor will perform an analysis to determine whether mediation 
is an appropriate tool for resolution of cases under Title III. In so 
doing, the contractor will focus on successful resolution of cases 
mediated, the maintenance of the mediated agreements, and 
qualitative assessments of both the process and outcomes, based on 
133 Id. The resolutions include formal and informal settlements, consent decrees, and 
litigation. Id. 
134 As reported in ADA Cases (BNA) Reporter. ADA: Americans with Disabilities Act of 
1990 Special Report, 146 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at 10 (Aug. 1, 1994). 
135 See 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a) (Supp. V 1993) (limiting private claimants to injunctive relief 
under Title III); cf. id. § 12188(b) (authorizing compensatory damages for aggrieved persons 
in actions brought by Attorney General). 
136 Proposal to Demonstrate the Application of Mediation to Achieve Voluntary 
Compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act: A National Model 4, 6 (Community 
Board Program, May 7, 1993) [hereinafter Community Board Proposal] (on file with author); 
TARGETING DISABILITY NEEDS, supra note 98, at 42. 
137 Community Board Proposal, supra note 136, at 2-4; TARGETING DISABILITY NEEDS, 
supra note 98, at 42. 
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information supplied by DOJ personnel, mediation program 
directors, and mediation participants.138 
Interim analysis of the project revealed some difficulties in 
execution.139 As a result of geographic limitations on referrals 
and failure of many referred parties to agree to mediate, few 
mediations had taken place as of mid-1994. By appearing to 
remove the threat of government action, the Department's initial 
practice of closing cases referred to mediation may have contributed 
to the reluctance of respondents to agree to mediation.1"0 More-
over, some complainants are reluctant to mediate, preferring to 
have the Department handle the case. The Community Board has 
been unable to educate potential parties about the benefits of 
mediation because of Privacy Act limitations on releasing the 
parties' identities.141 
The Department of Justice awarded an additional grant in 1994 
for an ADA education and pilot project for professional media-
tors.142 The goal of the program is 
to train a select number of professional mediators 
nationwide about Title III of the ADA, refer Title ill 
cases to these mediators for mediation, monitor the 
outcome of mediation efforts, and evaluate and 
disseminate the evaluation of the project to media-
tors and other interested parties nationwide, so that 
138 Community Board Proposal, supra note 136, at 7-8. The DOJ decided to limit 
mediation under the grant to Title Ill cases because it would be easier to evaluate a limited 
pilot program. Additionally, Title ll cases frequently are more complex and often more 
expensive because the defendant is an entire government entity. Meeting with Representa-
tives, Department of Justice, Disability Rights Section (Sept. 27, 1994) and Telephone 
Conversation with Eve Hill, Attorney, Department of Justice (March 9, 1995). 
139 Meeting with Representatives, Department of Justice, Disability Rights Section (Sept. 
27, 1994). 
140 Id. The Department, which always retained the ability to open a case for investigation 
if mediation failed has ceased closing cases referred to mediation. Letter from John L. 
Wodatch, supra note 70. 
141 Meeting with Representatives, Department of Justice, Disability Rights Section (Mar. 
28, 1994); see also 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1994) (preventing generally disclosure of records without 
written consent of person to whom record pertains). 
142 59 Fed. Reg. 29,160, 29,165 (1994); see also Press Release: Justice Department 
Awards 10 Grants to Promote the Americans with Disabilities Act 3 (Dep't of Justice, Oct. 
5, 1994) [hereinafter Press Release: Justice Department Awards 10 Grants] (announcing 
grant award to Key Bridge Foundation) (on file with author). 
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the project can be effectively replicated in other 
areas of the country.143 
The project will train ninety professional mediators about the ADA 
and develop a procedure for referring ADA complaints to the 
mediators.144 In addition, the grantee will produce a consumer 
guide to mediation services and a mediator's guide to mediating 
ADA complaints. The grantee anticipates mediating 650 com-
plaints. 
As of September 1995, fifty-two cases had been referred to the 
two pilot mediation projects.145 Of those, twelve were resolved 
through mediation and twenty-one remained pending with the 
mediation agencies. In the remaining cases, the respondent refused 
to participate in mediation; the Department of Justice is reevaluat-
ing these cases. 
In April 1995, the Attorney General established a formal program 
in the DOJ to promote greater use of ADR.146 The program will 
establish criteria and methodologies for various types of ADR and 
for identifying ADR methods to resolve categories of cases.147 The 
Order also requires comprehensive ADR training for civil attorneys, 
creates the position of Senior Counsel for Alternative Dispute 
Resolution, and mandates cooperation with court-sponsored 
ADR.14s 
C. TITLE IV 
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) had received 
only six complaints of ADA violations as of September 1, 1994, five 
143 59 Fed. Reg. 29,165. The DOJ has not ruled out mediation of Title II cases under this 
grant and may refer some Title II cases to mediation. Telephone Conversation with Eve Hill, 
Department of Justice, Disability Rights Section (Mar. 9, 1995). 
144 Press Release: Justice Department Awards 10 Grants, supra note 142, at 3. 
145 Telephone Conversation with Eve Hill, Attorney, Department of Justice, Disability 
Rights Section (Oct. 5, 1995). 
146 U.S. Dep't of Justice Order No. OBD 1160.1 (Apr. 6, 1995) [hereinafter Attorney 
General's Order]; ADR Ordered for the Department of Justice, ADR NETWORK, Juno 1995, at 
1. The Order contemplated dissemination of ADR guidance by each litigating division in tho 
agency by September 11, 1995. Attorney General's Order, at 2. 
147 Attorney General's Order, supra note 146, at 2. 
148 Id. at 1-2. 
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of which were resolved.149 While the FCC has not used ADR in 
ADA cases to date, the Commission has adopted an "Initial Policy 
Statement and Order" encouraging the use of ADR160 and has 
used negotiated rulemaking with some success in other areas. 
D. JOINT ADR 
In June 1995, the Administrative Conference of the United 
States151 (ACUS) adopted a recommendation for voluntary media-
tion of ADA cases under all four titles.162 The recommendation 
proposed a joint committee of agency representatives to develop an 
ADA mediation program, with assistance from an advisory 
committee of representatives from potential program participants, 
such as businesses, state and local governments, disability rights 
organizations, and labor organizations. 153 The recommendation 
suggests that the agencies determine the selection criteria for 
referral of cases to mediation.154 Further, the recommendation 
urges the committee to establish a thorough evaluation process to 
enable assessment of mediation's effectiveness in resolving ADA 
cases in accordance with the ADA's statutory goals.165 Finally, 
the recommendation encourages enforcement agencies to continue 
joint exploration of other ADR techniques for use in ADA dis-
putes.156 The agencies have taken initial steps to implement a 
149 Telephone Interview with Linda Dubroof, Senior Staff Attorney, Federal Communica-
tions Commission, Common Carrier Bureau (Sept. 6, 1994). 
iso 47 C.F.R. § 1.18 (1994). 
151 The ACUS is an independent federal agency whose responsibility is to make federal 
programs more effective, fair, and efficient. Am.UN. CONF. U.S., ARBITRATION 6 (1988). To 
accomplish this task, the Conference brings together experts from the public nnd private 
sectors to research, recommend, and assist in implementation of improvements in 
administrative law and agency procedures. Id. Effective October 31, 1995, Congress 
terminated funding for ACUS; the impact of this termination on the various programs 
discussed throughout this Article is unknown. Nevertheless, administrntive agencies may 
still implement ACUS recommendations. 
152 Use of Mediation Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 60 Fed. Reg. 43,115 
(1995) [hereinafter Recommendation]. 
153 Id. at 43,116. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. at 43,117. 
156 Id. 
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joint mediation program as recommended.157 In addition to the 
ACUS Recommendation, several organizations having ADA dispute-
resolution programs also handle or contemplate handling a variety 
of ADA disputes.158 
V. THE ADA AND MEDIATION 
In light of the statutory encouragement of ADR and the move 
toward use of mediation in ADA cases, evaluation of whether 
mediation is an effective enforcement tool consistent with statutory 
goals is appropriate. One must keep in mind, however, that "[i]f 
... reform benefits only judges, then it isn't worth pursuing. If it 
holds out progress only for the legal profession, then it isn't worth 
pursuing. It is worth pursuing only if it helps to redeem the 
promise of America. "159 Part V of this Article will evaluate the 
use of mediation in ADA cases and then analyze mediation as an 
ADA dispute resolution technique, making recommendations for 
establishment of effective programs consistent with the statutory 
mandate of eliminating disability discrimination. 
Despite the ADA's support of ADR, there is room for debate 
about whether ADR has a role to play in ADA disputes, particularly 
given the nature of the public rights involved. 16° Critics of ADR 
157 Letter from John R. Schmidt, Dep't of Justice, Office of Associate Att'y Gen., to 
Thomasina Rogers, Chair, ACUS (Oct. 25, 1995) (on file with author). 
158 E.g., Trade Winds Rehab. Ctr., Inc., Northwest Indiana Americans with Disabilities 
Act Mediation Project (Mar. 31, 1995) (on file with author); Telephone Interview with 
Suzanne Schmitz, Coordinator, ADR Clinic, Southern Illinois University (July 12, 1995). The 
Michigan Commission on Handicapper Concerns and the Michigan Supreme Court havo 
implemented a pilot mediation project for disability discrimination cases using community 
dispute resolution centers. Telephone Interview with Doug Van Epps, State Court 
Administrative Office (Oct. 1995). Each project has had limited success in obtaining 
agreements to mediate. 
159 A Leon Higginbotham, Jr., The Priority of Human Rights in Court Reform, 70 F.R.D. 
134, 138 (1976), quoted in Fitzpatrick, supra note 129, at 40. Benefits for the administrative 
enforcement agencies are comparable to those for judges and lawyers. While important, tho 
reform is of value only if it serves the ADA:s purpose of eliminating discrimination against 
individuals with disabilities. 
160 Some commentators have argued that ADR is inappropriate in cases involving 
significant public rights. E.g., HENRY J. BROWN & ARTHUR L. MARRIOIT, ADR PRINCIPLES 
AND PRACTICE 396 (1993); Irving R. Kaufman, Reform for A System in Crisis: Alternative 
Dispute Resolution in the Federal Courts, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 29 (1990); see also Martin 
H. Malin & Robert F. Ladenson, Privatizing Justice: A Jurisprudential Perspective on Labor 
and Employment Arbitration from the Steelworkers Trilogy to Gilmer, 44 HAsTINGS L. J. 
1187, 1238 (1993) (arguing publicjustice values underlying discrimination statutes are best 
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argue that it limits courts' role in establishing norms, 161 a process 
of giving "meaning to our public values."162 Because the ADA 
became effective only three years ago, much of the Act remains to 
be developed through judicial decisions. While this is a persuasive 
reason to maintain litigation as a primary enforcement strategy, it 
does not justify preclusion of ADR in ADA cases. A large number 
of ADA cases are backlogged at the investigation stage and, in light 
of crowded court dockets, likely will become backlogged at the 
litigation stage as well. The agencies have resources to litigate 
only a small number of cases and obtaining counsel for litigation is 
difficult for many complainants in employment discrimination 
cases.163 ADR, particularly mediation, offers some promise of 
quicker, less expensive disposition of cases with greater litigant 
satisfaction. As convincingly noted by the Pound Conference 
Report: 
The ultimate goal is to make it possible for our 
system to provide justice for all. Constitutional 
guarantees of human rights ring hollow ifthere is no 
forum available in fact for their vindication. Statuto-
ry rights become empty promises if adjudication is 
too long delayed to make them meaningful or the 
value of a claim is consumed by the expense of 
asserting it.164 
preserved by de novo review ofarbitral determinations oflnw in discrimination cases). 
161 See Harry T. Edwards, Alternatiue Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 
HARV. L. REv. 668, 671-72 (1986) (discussing importance of ensuring that resolution of public 
rights and duties through ADR will not result in abandoning constitutional system); Owen 
M. Fiss, Against Settlenumt, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984) (arguing settlement deprives 
courts of occasions to interpret laws); Kaufman, supra note 160, at 30 (stating trials enforce 
public norms while settlements evade them). However, as Kaufman suggests, resolutions 
tbrough ADR have no greater impact on this function than settlements reached tbrough 
other mechanisms. Id. at 29-30. 
162 Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 
HARV. L. REv. 1, 31 (1979); see also Daniel ?.fisternvich, The Limits of Allernatiue Dispute 
Resolution: Preseroing the Judicial Function, 70 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 37, 39-40 (1992) 
(arguing courts serve a greater function than merely dispute resolution). 
163 William M. Howard, Arbitrating Employment Discrimination Claims: Do You Really 
Have to? Do You Really Want to?, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 256, 288 (1994). 
164 NATIONAL CONF. ON CAUSES OF POPULAR DISSATISFACTION WITH ADMIN. OF JUST., THE 
POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FtmmE 300 (1979), quoted in 
Kaufman, supra note 160, at 38. 
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The delays in investigation and adjudication of ADA cases and 
the number of cases where litigation costs outweigh the value of 
the claim argue for the use of ADR in appropriate cases. 
A. IS MEDIATION APPROPRIATE UNDER THE ADA? 
Mediation has significant potential for effective resolution of ADA 
disputes.165 In view of the large number of complaints, settle-
ment, accomplished with or without mediation, is essential to 
effective enforcement of the statute.166 Nevertheless, caution 
must be used in adopting ADR because of the need for judicial 
development of the law. In adopting a mediation policy, adminis-
trative agencies must balance the interest of establishing the law 
with the interest of achieving benefits for discrimination victims. 
An agency mediation program can be designed that will not 
interfere with the function of developing judicially created law. 
First, if mediation is voluntary, many cases will not be mediated 
due to the absence of an agreement to mediate.167 Second, many 
cases will not settle in mediation, leaving them available for 
litigation.168 Finally, enforcement agencies can and should screen 
165 Sander and Goldberg suggest a rule of presumptive mediation, i.e., that mediation 
should be the first ADR method of choice to promote settlement because of its great potential 
for resolving disputes. Frank E. A. Sander & Stephen B. Goldberg, Fitting the Forum to the 
Fuss: A User-Friendly Guide to Selecting an ADR Procedure, 10 NEGOTIATION J. 49, 59 
(1994). 
166 Professor Alfred Blumrosen has stated, "Settlements are the lifeblood of equal 
opportunity law." Oversight Hearing, supra note 94, at *4. 
161 Indeed, in most civil rights mediation programs, the problem has been achieving the 
agreement to mediate, not the mediation of inappropriate cases. For example, in the EEOC 
pilot project, while 87% of charging parties agreed to mediate, only 43% of respondents 
agreed, which would leave for litigation more than half of the cases in which mediation was 
offered. See EEOC Report on ADR Pilot Program, supra note 99, at 3. Of mediation-eligible 
cases in the program, only 29% were actually mediated. EEOC Mediation Program 
Evaluation, supra note 100, at 76. In the District of Columbia Department of Human Rights 
and Minority Business Development mediation program, only about one third of respondents 
agree to mediate. Telephone interview with La Verne Fletcher, Acting Supervisor, Mediation 
(Nov. 10, 1994). In a mediation pilot project at the Illinois Department of Human Rights, 
only 11 % of respondents agreed to mediate. Carol McHugh Sanders, Summer to Spell Relief 
for Rights Agency, CHICAGO DAILY L. BULL., June 23, 1995, at 1. 
168 Settlement rates for most civil rights mediation programs have ranged from 40% to 
70%. In the EEOC pilot program, 52% of mediated cases settled. EEOC Report on ADR 
Pilot Program, supra note 99, at 3. Thus, only 15% of the charges originally eligible for 
mediation settled. EEOC Mediation Program Evaluation, supra note 100, at 76. The 
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cases at their intake, identifying those raising issues the agency 
has targeted for law development. Such cases should not be 
referred for mediation, but rather investigated for litigation.169 
Thus, the law-development function can be preserved while making 
quicker dispute resolution available to parties with routine cases. 
1. The Advantages of ADA Mediation. Mediation is appropriate 
in ADA cases for many of the same reasons it is generally attrac-
tive. 170 First, settlement of cases is an essential part of the 
enforcement effort, as resources for litigation of all cases are simply 
unavailable. Mediation offers the promise of settlement with the 
assistance of a neutral party trained to help the parties resolve 
their disputes. It is a low-cost alternative to litigation, with 
potential for resolving disputes more quickly.171 Where the cost 
of litigation exceeds the value of the claim, mediation can achieve 
cost-effective relief for the charging party and resolution for the 
respondent.172 Second, mediation may reduce agency backlogs if 
settlement rate at the D.C. Department of Human Rights hna been 40.50%. Telephone 
interview with La Verne Fletcher, Acting Supervisor, Mediation (Nov. 10, 1994). 
169 Letter from Richard T. Seymour, Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, to 
Frances M. Hart, Executive Officer, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 5-6 (Sept. 
20, 1993) [hereinafter Lawyers Committee Comments] (on file with author). 
170 The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, 5 U.S.C. § 572 (1994), provides the 
necessary authority for enforcement agency use of voluntary mediation. Companion bills 
were introduced in the 103d Congress to encourage mediation of ADA TiUe I cases along 
with other discrimination cases. S. 2327, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994); H.R. 2016, 103d Cong., 
1st Sess. (1993). These bills contemplated mediation after the EEOC hna found reasonable 
cause and after it issues a right-to-sue letter to the charging party. No legislation was 
enacted, however. 
171 Speedy resolution benefits both the parties and the agency. Mediation can reduce stnff 
time required for each case. See Project on Equal Educ. Rights, NOW Legal Defense and 
Educ. Fund & SRI Int'l, An Analysis of Using Mediation to Resolve Civil Rights Complaints 
105-06 (1980) [hereinafter PEER Study]. The EEOC study was unable to determine whether 
staff time was reduced because of lack of comparative data nvnilable at the time of the 
report. EEOC Mediation Program Evaluation, supra note 100, at 47-48, 78-79, v. A 
potential benefit to charging parties is that mediation may result in more merit ~lutions 
than the regular charge process. Id. at 56. Such resolutions may benefit employers by 
improving communication, procedures, efficiency, and morale. Id. 
172 While obtaining legal representation in employment discrimination cases is difficult 
for complainants, it might be easier to obtain counsel for mediation because of the limited 
investment of time and money required. Howard, supra note 163, at 288. 
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it is utilized during, or prior to, the investigative process.173 
Reduction of backlogs will benefit ADA complainants and respon-
dents by decreasing processing time for all complaints. 
Furthermore, mediation focuses on the underlying interests of 
the parties and accommodates those interests in a resolution 
agreeable to the parties. 174 Compliance with a negotiated 
resolution of the dispute is more likely because the solution was 
devised and agreed to by the parties.175 
Mediation may be effective in preserving relationships which 
otherwise might be destroyed or at least severely damaged by the 
adversary process.176 This is particularly important in non-
discharge employment cases. Mediation increases the control of the 
parties over the dispute resolution process, which many mediation 
173 Empirical evidence regarding the efficiency of mediation is mixed. Kenneth Kresse} 
& Dean G. Pruitt, Conclusion: A Research Perspectiue on the Mediation of Social Conflict, 
in MEDIATION RESEARCH 398-99 (Kenneth Kresse} et al. eds., 1989). Kresse} and Pruitt note 
there is "little evidence that mediation has had any appreciable effect in reducing court 
backlogs." Id. at 398. The PEER Study found that the EEOC substantially decreased its 
backlog during the time period in which Rapid Charge Processing was used, see infra notes 
243-244 and accompanying text (discussing processing system), but noted that a number of 
other reforms contributed to the reduction. PEER Study, supra note 171, at 100-04. The 
PEER Study concluded that mediation was not a major factor in reduction of the backlog, 
but did contribute to expedited processing of new charges. Id. at 102. The evaluation of the 
EEOC pilot project was unable to determine the impact on case-processing speed because of 
the timing of the evaluation. EEOC Mediation Program Evaluation, supra note 100, at 76, 
v. Additional study by the agency may enable such a determination. Id. 
174 See Stephen B. Goldberg, Meditations of a Mediator, 2 NEGOTIATION J. 345, 348 (1986) 
(noting benefits of mediator focus on clients' interests rather than legal issues); Craig A. 
McEwen, Note on Mediation Research, in DISPUTE RESOLUTION 155, 156 (Stephen B. 
Goldberg et al. eds., 2d ed. 1992). Ury, Brett, and Goldberg identify three approaches to 
resolving disputes. The disputing parties may "seek to (1) reconcile their underlying 
interests, (2) determine who is right, and/or (3) determine who is more powerful." WILLIAM 
L. URY ET AL., GETI'ING DISPUTES RESOLVED 4-5 (1988). Reconciling interests generally 
results in "lower transaction costs, greater satisfaction with outcomes, less strain on the 
relationship, and less recurrence of disputes." Id. at 15. However, "[t)he reconciliation of 
interests takes place within the context of the parties' rights and power." Id. at 9. 
Nevertheless, interests may be reconciled without determining who is right or who is more 
powerful. Sander & Goldberg, supra note 165, at 56. 
175 Kenneth R. Feinberg, Mediation-A Preferred Method of Dispute Resolution, 16 PEPP, 
L. REV. S5, S12 (1989); Folberg & Taylor, supra note 11, at 36; Kresse} & Pruitt, supra note 
173, at 396-97; Craig A. McEwen & Richard J. Maiman, Small Claims Mediation in Maine: 
An Empirical Assessment, 33 ME. L. REV. 237, 261 (1981); Janice A. Roehl & Royer F. Cook, 
Mediation in Interpersonal Disputes, in MEDIATION RESEARCH, supra note 173, at 31, 34-35. 
176 Feinberg, supra note 175, at Sll; Folberg & Taylor, supra note 11, at 10-11. 
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experts believe increases self-esteem and competence.177 Most 
mediation studies reflect high levels of participant satisfaction. 178 
Finally, in an ongoing relationship such as that between employer 
and employee, mediation may improve the conflict resolution skills 
of the parties, thus reducing the number and intensity of future 
disputes.179 
2. The Disadvantages of ADA Mediation. Despite these advan-
tages, mediation of ADA disputes raises concerns as well. Resolu-
tion of disputes through mediation may result in a diminished 
ability to identify and resolve systemic discrimination prob-
lems.180 Mediation may tend to focus on individual issues to 
facilitate the process, 181 and the enforcement agency or the 
mediator typically will not have the means to identify and notify 
potential class members, thereby making it difficult to mediate 
class cases at the pre-litigation stage.182 As a result, respondents 
have little incentive to mediate class cases because any settlement 
117 Folberg & Taylor, supra note 11, at 11, 35; see also Robert A. Baruch Bush, Efficiency 
and Protecti-On or Empowerment and Recognition?: The Mediator's Role and Ethical 
Standards in Mediati-On, 41 U. FLA. L. REV. 253, 266-73 (1989) (contending primmy benefit 
of mediation process is self-determination). 
178 Stephen B. Goldberg & Jeanne M. Brett, Disputants Perspectives on the Differences 
Between Mediati-On and Arbitrati-On, 6 NEGOTIATION J. 249, 250-52 (1990); Kaufman, supra 
note 160, at 22-23; Kressel & Pruitt, supra note 173, at 395-96; McEwen & l\fuimnn, supra 
note 175, at 254-60. Among factors influencing participant satisfaction are the level of 
control and privacy, Kressel & Pruitt, supra note 173, at 396, the belief thnt the mediator 
understood the dispute, the lack of formality, and the belief that important facts were heard, 
Goldberg & Brett, supra, at 251-52. Data suggest that satisfaction level is not dependent 
on outcome. Id.; Kaufman, supra note 160, at 23. 
179 Mediation may also promote "cooperative problem-solving behavior thnt would mnke 
future disputes easier to resolve." Goldberg & Brett, supra note 178, at 253. Improvement 
of conflict-resolution skills is similarly valuable in contexts other thnn the employer-employee 
relationship-for example, public accommodation cases involving regular customers, such as 
doctors and patients, and public entity cases involving regular consumers of government 
services, such as a dispute between a city transportation agency and a group of disabled 
commuters. Where disability-rights advocates are involved in a dispute, use of mediation 
may improve the ability of the defendant and the disability community to resolve future 
disputes. 
180 Marjorie A. Silver, The Uses and Abuses of Informal Procedures in Federal Ciuil Rights 
Enforcement, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 482, 540 (1987). 
181 PEER Study, supra note 171, at 127. Nevertheless, in the EEOC pilot project, 21% 
of the cases settled involved an agreement to change some management practice or 
procedure, potentially having systemic benefit beyond the charging party. EEOC Mediation 
Program Evaluation, supra note 100, at 55. 
182 PEER Study, supra note 171, at 127. 
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will not bind the class members.183 Moreover, there may be little 
incentive for an enforcement agency to raise class issues, as they 
might jeopardize a mediated settlement.184 
Furthermore, weaker parties may be disadvantaged by the less 
formal procedures of mediation.185 Of course, those most likely 
to be less powerful in an employment dispute, or even in a public 
accommodation or services dispute, are individuals with disabilities. 
If mediation disadvantages these individuals relative to litigation, 
then it is incompatible with the entire purpose of the ADA.186 
Similarly, an individual's disability may preclude effective partici-
153 Id. 
184 Id. at 128. 
185 See Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice 
in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359, 1398-99 (arguing less formal 
procedures of ADR do not contain protections against prejudice existing in judicial forums); 
see also Richard Abel, Informalism: A Tactical Equivalent to Law?, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 
375, 383 (1985) (noting "[n]othing could be more unbalanced than a confrontation between 
the mammoth corporation and the individual worker"); cf. William Simon, Legal Informality 
and Redistributive Politics, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 384, 386, 388 (1985) (noting "[f]ormal 
systems tend to be more difficult for people without special training or experience" and "can 
also subvert conflict and induce acquiescence"). There is some evidence that mediation is 
more likely to result in agreement when the parties are of relatively equal power. Kresse} 
& Pruitt, supra note 173, at 404-05. A study of 600 cases in a New Mexico small claims 
court evaluated the outcome of cases randomly assigned to mediation and acijudication. 
Women fared better in mediation than in acijudication, although their subjective evaluation 
of mediation was more negative than their evaluation ofacijudication. Minorities, who were 
predominantly Hispanic, fared worse in mediation than in acijudication. Moreover, minority 
disputants fared worse than whites in mediation, although the differences disappeared when 
both mediators were of color. However, minority disputants were more enthusiastic about 
mediation than white disputants, despite an objective monetary disadvantage. James Alflni 
et al., What Happens When Mediation is Institutionalized?: To the Parties, Practitioners, and 
Host Institutions?, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 307, 316-17 (1994) (comments of Professor 
Michele Hermann). One explanation of these differences may be that the parties are more 
interested in process than outcome. Id. at 322 (comments of Robert Baruch Bush). 
This disadvantage, if true, may contradict one of the perceived advantages of mediation: 
the empowerment of the parties. See McEwen, supra note 174, at 156 ("No compelling 
evidence exists to resolve the debate between those who argue that mediation empowers 
disputants and those who argue that it harms disadvantaged parties."). It is possible that 
both positions are valid. A party may be empowered (or feel empowered) by the process yet 
objectively receive less relief than he or she would have received in litigation. As McEwen 
notes, definitions of empowerment may vary as well: one may view empowerment as coming 
only with legal advocacy, while another may view it as coming from more direct involvement 
in the dispute and its resolution. Id. 
186 In determining any disadvantage, however, the empowerment potential of mediation 
should be considered and valued. Additionally, when balancing the benefits oflitigation and 
settlement, the psychological costs of lengthy litigation should not be undervalued. 
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pation in mediation which, unlike litigation, typically requires more 
direct involvement by the parties.187 Finally, the primary func-
tion of agencies utilizing ADR may change from law enforcement 
to conflict resolution.188 Any mediation procedure used in ADA 
cases must account for these important concerns. 
3. Administrative Responses. Both the EEOC's proposed ADR 
program and the ACUS-recommendedjoint program recognize and 
attempt to deal with these issues. As the EEOC noted in its recent 
Policy Statement on ADR, the Agency has a dual mission: 
enforcing federal anti-discrimination laws and resolving employ-
ment disputes.189 The ADR program must further this dual 
mission, ensuring that neither part of the mission suffers from 
overemphasis on the other.190 The Agency also recognizes that 
the ADR program must be fair to participants. According to the 
EEOC, fairness requires (1) providing as much information as 
possible about the ADR proceeding to the parties as soon as 
possible; (2) providing the opportunity for assistance during the 
proceeding to any unrepresented party; (3) knowing, willing, and 
voluntary participation at all times during the ADR proceeding; (4) 
using a neutral third-party facilitator knowledgeable in equal 
employment opportunity law and trained in mediation theory and 
techniques; (5) maintaining the confidentiality of the proceeding, 
including insulating the neutral from the investigation and 
compliance process; and (6) ensuring the enforceability of any 
agreement reached.191 Finally, the EEOC policy establishes that 
its ADR programs should include training of EEOC employees, the 
public, persons protected under the laws, employers, and neutrals, 
as well as evaluation of the program to determine whether it has 
achieved its goals, whether it needs improvement, and how that 
might be accomplished.192 
The ACUS-recommended program contains many of these same 
187 See TARGETING DISABILITY NEEDS, supra note 98, at 35-37. 
188 See PEER Study, supra note 171, at 9-10. 
189 EEOC Policy Statement on Alternative Dispute Resolulwn, DAILY LAB. REP., July 18, 
1995, at E-13 [hereinafter EEOC Policy Statement]. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. 
192 Id. 
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important elements. 193 Mediation is voluntary and confiden-
tial. 194 If adopted by the agencies, the program will utilize a 
common group of trained mediators with knowledge of the statute, 
familiarity with resources for ADA compliance, and knowledge 
about the impact of various disabilities.195 The recommendation 
urges the joint committee designing the program to identify sources 
of technical expertise to assist in resolving disputes, such as 
architects, engineers, and vocational rehabilitation experts, who 
may be able to suggest reasonable accommodations for employees 
or alterations for public accommodations accessibility.196 
Like the EEOC program, the ACUS Recommendation contem-
plates extensive educational efforts to inform the parties about the 
process.197 Such education can improve both the process and its 
effectiveness, particularly for unrepresented parties.198 The 
program incorporates agency review of settlements to insure 
enforceability and consistency with the ADA.199 Further, the 
recommendation urges an extensive evaluation process to insure 
that the mediation program is operating consistently with statutory 
goals.200 The evaluation process would include analysis of wheth-
er systemic problems exist which are not being addressed by 
mediated settlements and whether individuals with disabilities or 
unrepresented parties (often one and the same) are disadvantaged 
by mediation relative to litigation.201 
Recently, the Task Force on Alternative Dispute Resolution in 
Employment (Task Force), a group of individuals from diverse 
organizations involved in labor and employment law, established a 
"Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory 
193 Given the consistency of the two proposals, they could be implemented in coajunction 
with one another, with appropriate planning and consideration by the proposed joint 
committee recommended by ACUS. 
194 Recommendation, supra note 152, at 43,116-43,117. 
19s Id. 
196 Id. at 43,116 n.5. 
197 Id. 
198 Id. 
199 Id. The review is not intended to overturn individual settlements, however. Id. 
200 Id. at 43,116-43,117. 
201 Id. at 43,117. 
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Disputes Arising out of the Employment Relationship."202 The 
Protocol was designed to ensure due process in employment 
mediation and arbitration to encourage expeditious, accessible, 
inexpensive, and fair private enforcement of statutory claims. 203 
The goal of the Task Force was to encourage a system to reduce 
resolution delays created by backlogs in the administrative agencies 
and the courts.204 Although directed at private dispute resolu-
tion, the Task Force recommendations include many of the same 
components as the EEOC and ACUS-recommended programs, 
including employee representation with potential partial employer 
reimbursement of the cost; access to information about both the 
process and the substance of the dispute; and use of qualified, 
trained neutrals whose cost is to be shared equally when possi-
ble.205 Further analysis of these important components illumi-
nates how to structure a mediation program for ADA cases which 
is consistent with statutory goals while resolving disputes in a 
timely, mutually agreeable manner. 
B. THE ELEMENTS OF ADA MEDIATION 
1. Design Input from Stakeholders. Both the EEOC program and 
the ACUS Recommendation wisely contemplate significant input 
from potential participants in the mediation program. The ACUS 
Recommendation endorses the use of an advisory committee, 
composed of representatives from potential participants such as 
businesses, state and local government bodies, individuals with 
disabilities, and labor organizations, to provide advice in program 
design. 206 The EEOC program asks its district offices, responsible 
202 Prototype Agreement on Job Bias Dispute Resolution, DAILY LAB. REP., May 11, 1995, 
at E-11 [hereinafter Due Process Protocol]. The Protocol has been endorsed by the National 
Academy of Arbitrators Board of Governors and by union and management representatives 
of the Employment and Labor Law Section of the American Bar Association. AtxuJemy Board 
Endorses ADR Task Force Protocol, 149 Lab. Rel. Rep. CBNA) No. 6, at 176 (June 5, 1995). 
203 Due Process Protocol, supra note 202, at E-11. 
204 Id. 
205 Id. 
206 Recommendation, supra note 152, at 43,116. In Tille I cases where employees are 
represented by a union, unique issues arise which must be accounted for during program 
design and settlement. Nancy Segal, The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution to Resolve 
ADA Issues in the Unionized Workplace 2-3 (21st Ann. Conf. ofSoc'y of Profs. in Disp. Resol., 
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for proposing specific ADR programs consistent with the national 
policy, to consult with both "internal and external stakeholders to 
assist them in the development and implementation" of their ADR 
programs. 207 
Input from potential participants is essential. For a mediation 
program to be effective, it must meet the needs of the parties.208 
Disputants are more likely to use the procedures if they are 
involved in the design process.209 Involvement by representatives 
of likely program participants will enable them to educate and 
motivate their constituents to participate in mediation, enhancing 
the likelihood of the program's success.210 Additionally, represen-
tatives from the disability community and small employers can help 
to design a program that deals effectively with the concern that less 
powerful participants may be disadvantaged by mediation. 
Agency mediation programs also should solicit input from agency 
personnel who will come in contact with the process in any way. 
Like potential participants, these individuals will have insights into 
ADA cases from their involvement in the investigation and 
litigation systems that will inform the process design. In addition, 
agency personnel must be committed to the success of the program. 
Agency personnel who deal regularly with charging parties and 
respondents can educate them about the mediation program, 
improving both the likelihood of participation and the effectiveness 
of participation. Such education is more likely to occur and will be 
more effective if agency personnel are consulted on program design 
and are therefore presumptively committed to the program's 
success. 
The ACUS Recommendation endorses use of the Federal Advisory 
Committee Act (F ACA)211 to provide a mechanism for incorporat-
Oct. 20-23, 1993) (on file with author); see also Ann C. Hodges, The ADA in the Unionized 
Workplace, 48 U. MIAMI L. REY. 567 (1994) (reviewing applicability of ADA to unions and 
employers and proposing several context-specific interpretations of Act). Accordingly, 
involvement oflabor organizations in the program design process is essential. 
207 Motions on Alternative Dispute ResolutionAdopted by EEOC April 25, 1995, supra note 
121, atE-1. 
208 URY ET AL., supra note 174, at 65. 
209 Id.; Operational Aspects of Designing Dispute Resolution Systems § I, at 4 (Admin. 
Conf. U.S., Feb. 1994) [hereinafter Designing Systems]. 
210 URY ET AL., supra note 174, at 76. 
211 See 5 U.S.C. app. I (1994) (setting forth FACA). 
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ing the input of representatives in the design of the mediation 
program.212 FACA permits establishment of an advisory commit-
tee when the head of the involved agency determines it is in the 
public interest to do so in connection with the performance of the 
agency's duties.213 FACA establishes the procedure for creation 
and operation of the committees, 214 and although FACA?s require-
ments may appear cumbersome, appointment of such a committee 
will insure effective input into the design process through the 
exchange of ideas among the participating representatives. The 
communication and commitment inherent in the advisory commit-
tee process provide distinct advantages over mere solicitation of 
written comments and should enhance both the development of the 
mediation program and subsequent participation in the process. 
Even if a formal advisory committee is not utilized, solicitation 
of input from "stakeholders" is necessary to the success of a 
mediation program. Using a format similar to that of FACA will 
provide some of the advantages of that process. Private mediation 
agencies and employers considering creation of an ADA mediation 
program should follow the example of government agencies, 
carefully developing it with advice from representatives of potential 
participants. 215 
2. Case Selection and Timing. The conventional wisdom on 
mediation suggests it is most appropriate for cases having a range 
of possible solutions, where the dispute is fact-based and where 
preservation of continuing relationships is important. Reasonable 
accommodation cases fit neatly within this description.216 In such 
212 Recommendation, supra note 152, at 43,116. 
213 5 U.S.C. app. II, § 9(a){2). 
214 Id. §§ 7-13. 
215 TheADR Clinic at Southern Illinois University has followed this model in establishing 
its ADR mediation program. Information from Suzanne Schmitz, ADR Project Coordinator, 
Southern Illinois University. 
Employers establishing mediation programs also should solicit input from employees. The 
Hughes .Aircraft ADR program, often cited as a model of a successful program, has 
incorporated substantial employee input. See Simon & Sochynsky, supra note 126, at 41 
(discussing Hughes's program). 
216 The EEOC's regulations suggest that the process of determining a reasonable 
accommodation is an informal, interactive process designed to identify the precise limitations 
caused by the employee's disability and reasonable accommodations that would permit the 
employee to perform the job. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(0)(3) (1995). The appropriate accommoda-
tion must be determined on a case-by-case basis. Id. pt. 1630, app. The EEOC recommends 
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cases, the employee is seeking an accommodation from the 
employer to enable the employee to work. Frequently, a range of 
possible accommodations exists, varying in cost, difficulty, and 
effectiveness. The employee and the employer would be well served 
by attempting to reach a mediated solution to the problem, 
minimizing hostility and finding an accommodation best satisfying 
both parties.217 
Although reasonable accommodation cases may seem most 
appropriate for mediation, mediation potential is not limited to 
such cases. Some mediation scholars have suggested that, based 
on mediation's potential for resolving disputes, it should be the 
ADR method of first choice.218 Two obstacles may impede the 
success of mediation: differing views of the facts or the law and a 
claimant's desire for a jackpot recovery.219 Nevertheless, an 
effective mediator may be able to assist the parties in reaching a 
solution without resolving the factual and legal disputes. 220 
Although mediation may be less successful when the facts favor one 
side, where precedent needs to be formalized, where one party 
wants retribution rather than resolution, where the conflicts of 
interest are too great, or where power is exceedingly unequal, 221 
none of these factors render ADA cases inappropriate for mediation. 
However, these indicators should be used in screening cases for 
consultation with the employee and use of technical assistance to determine the appropriate 
accommodation. Id. pt. 1630, app.; § 1630.9. The process is one of problem-solving, precisely 
the sort of dispute for which mediation is designed. Id.; see also Karen Roberts & M. 
Catherine Lundy, The ADA and the NLRA: Resolving Accommodation Disputes in Unionized 
Workplaces, 11 NEGOTIATION J. 29, 36-39 (1995) (suggesting mediation process for resolving 
reasonable accommodation disputes in unionized settings where issues may additionally 
involve other employees and collective bargaining agreement). 
Although the EEOC pilot program did not include reasonable accommodation cases, tho 
data showed that cases in which a continuing employment relationship existed were both 
more likely to be mediated and more likely to settle. EEOC Mediation Program Evaluation, 
supra note 100, at 29, 33, 44-45. 
217 Public accommodation barrier-removal cases might be successfully mediated for tho 
same reasons. 
218 E.g., Sander & Goldberg, supra note 165, at 59. Even when parties think no 
possibility of settlement exists, they may be surprised to find that mediation works. Lex K. 
Larson, Mediation of Industrial Commission Cases, 17 CAMPBELL L. REV. 395, 406 (1995). 
219 Sander & Goldberg, supra note 165, at 59. 
220 Id. 
221 Linda deLeon, Using Mediation to Resolve Personnel Disputes in a State Bureaucracy, 
10 NEGOTIATION J. 69, 69-70 (1994). 
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mediation where resources are limited. 
Generally, one would expect mediation to be more difficult in 
cases involving issues such as discharge or whether an individual 
is disabled within the meaning of the ADA. However, an employer 
who adamantly refuses to reemploy a discharged individual might 
be willing to provide backpay and a positive reference in order to 
avoid litigation.222 Similarly, a dispute over whether an individu-
al is disabled can be resolved by settling the underlying prob-
lem-for example, the provision of a reasonable accommoda-
tion-without determining whether a statutory disability exists. 
Furthermore, the success of negotiated rulemaking and mediation 
of environmental disputes has demonstrated that even large, multi-
party disputes can be resolved through alternative processes.223 
In a voluntary system, mediation generally should not be denied 
to parties who desire to mediate. Nevertheless, in a government-
sponsored system 'vith limited resources, some screening may be 
necessary. The ACUS Recommendation suggests that agencies 
establish criteria for referral of cases to mediation.224 The EEOC 
policy merely indicates that flexibility to adjust to program needs 
and workloads is essential. 225 When mediation is first imp le-
222 See EEOC's Report on ADR Pilot Program, supra note 99, nt 4 (describing types of 
relief negotiated in mediated settlements). 
223 See Am,fiN. CONF. OF U.S., NEGOTIATED RUI.EM:AKING SOURCEBOOK 330-36 (Dnvid M. 
Pritzker & Deborah S. Dalton eds., 1990) (describing EPA'a experience with negotiated 
rulemaking); LINDA R. SINGER, SE1TLING DISPUTES 140-50 (1990) (discussing medintion of 
environmental issues and negotiation of government regulations); DISPUTE REsoLUTJON, 
supra note 174, at 345-56 (discussing negotiated rulemnking generally). 
Disputes regarding the ADA'a transportation provisions, however, mny be less susceptible 
to mediation for reasons other than the complexity of the dispute and the number of 
interested parties. Many of the statutory requirements are quite specific, leaving less room 
for the flexibility of mediated solutions. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12162 (Supp. V 1993) 
(prohibiting as discriminatory purchase of new rail passenger cnra unless they are accessible 
to individuals with disabilities). Nevertheless, these disputes should not be excluded from 
mediation. Even when the statutory requirements have not been complied with, 11 mediated 
solution including a timetable for compliance may be preferable te litigation. The Federnl 
Transit Administration has taken a similar approach in negotiating compliance agreements 
for ADA requirements relating to complementary paratrnnsit and key station accessibility. 
Federal Transit Administration, Office of Civil Rights, Informal Compliance Process (July 
1, 1993). However, it is questionable whether an agency-approved mediation agreement thnt 
conflicted with specific statutory requirements would be legal. 
224 Recommendation, supra note 152, at 43,116. 
225 See EEOC Policy Statement, supra note 189, at 3. 
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mented, no category of cases should be expressly excluded. Careful 
data should be collected, however, to ascertain the types of cases for 
which mediation is more effective and to determine the reasons for 
its greater effectiveness in those cases.226 Accordingly, future 
mediation resources can be targeted where most effective. 
As to the timing of mediation, there is little reason to deny 
mediation at any point in the investigation or litigation if both 
parties desire to mediate, unless mediation is being used to delay 
the proceedings or to impose costs on the party with fewer resourc-
es. Preferably, however, a mediation program should be designed 
so that referral occurs at a specific point in the case process. If 
mediation takes place early in the investigative process, before 
positions harden, settlement may be more likely. 227 In agency-
sponsored mediation, early mediation also has the advantage of 
limiting the expenditure of investigative resources, thus enabling 
backlog reduction and speedier case processing, both of which 
benefit the parties and the government. On the other hand, early 
in the investigation process, parties may be less motivated to settle 
because they are insufficiently aware of the strengths and weak-
nesses of their own position as well as that of the other party.228 
Because the EEOC has adopted both an early assessment 
program and an ADR program, the two may work together to 
achieve the benefits of rapid complaint resolution. 229 An effective 
226 Employers and private mediation agencies instituting ADA mediation programs should 
also monitor and evaluate their programs for these same reasons, thereby enabling 
mediation efforts to be focused where most effective. 
227 MOORE, supra note 7, at 57. In the EEOC pilot project, employers were more willing 
to mediate if they had not yet responded to the Agency's investigation. EEOC Mediation 
Program Evaluation, supra note 100, at 33. 
228 EEOC Mediation Program Evaluation, supra note 100, at 33. Thie may create 
particular problems for complainants having insufficient access to information to evaluate 
the strength of their case. For this reason, the Lawyers Committee suggests that some 
investigation take place prior to referral to ADR. See Lawyers Committee Comments, supra 
note 169, at 2. An information exchange also would address this concern. See infra notes 
277-281 and accompanying text. 
229 The EEOC program classifies new charges into three categories, based on information 
provided by the charging party. "A" cases are those which the Commission will definitely 
investigate, such as cases involving alleged egregious violations, novel questions of law or 
areas of the Jaw requiring development in the courts. "C" cases are those in which no 
information exists to suggest a violation of the law and for which a full investigation will not 
be undertaken. EEOC: House Panel Elicits Details on Changes Under Way at EEOC, DAILY 
LAB. REP., May 24, 1995, at A-9. A similar pilot program has been operating in tho 
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early resolution program requires careful and thorough training of 
the staff members responsible for assigning a priority to investiga-
tion of a case.230 Training particular employees to perform this 
function, rather than using the case investigator or intake officer, 
has substantial benefits. Intensive training of a few people will 
make the system function more efficiently than limited training of 
the entire staff. Moreover, if the assessing employee were also the 
investigator, he or she may be motivated to ignore information that 
casts doubt on the accuracy of the initial assessment. Finally, an 
investigator may be reluctant to refer to mediation those cases that 
appear likely to settle, desiring instead to retain credit for the 
settlement. 231 
The initial assessment interview, whether done in person or by 
telephone, should reveal the nature of the dispute: whether the 
dispute turns primarily on factual issues, legal issues, or both; 
whether it involves novel legal questions; whether technical 
expertise might be useful; whether systemic problems may 
exist;232 and whether the case appears frivolous or unsupported 
by any evidence. 
Great care should be taken in developing the questions to be 
asked in the initial interview and in training the staff to ensure 
that cases are initially correctly classified, because correct classifi-
Washington, D.C., Field Office of the EEOC since 1991. 
230 The EEOC has requested additional funds for training "front line field stafi'" about the 
new charge processing procedures. Statement of EEOC Chairman Casellas, supra note 78, 
atE-6. 
231 EEOC Report on ADR Pilot Program, supra note 99, at 7. Of course, if the ultimate 
goal is fair settlement of cases whenever possible, credit for the setUement is irrelevant. If 
mediation is a better vehicle for achieving a fair, mutually agreenble setUement it should be 
encouraged. 
232 If class or systemic issues are apparent in the initial assessment interview, the agency 
should consider whether referral to mediation is appropriate. See PEER Study, supra note 
171, at 126-34 (discussing class issues in agency mediation). 
Also significant at this point is whether the complainant can effectively participate in 
mediation. To avoid the very stereotyping the ADA was designed to eliminate, an agency 
should be extremely cautious when determining that an individwil does not have the 
capacity to participate in mediation. Rather, the agency should explore altenlJltive ways to 
mediate effectively with the individual before concluding that mediation will not be effective. 
TARGETING DISABILITY NEEDS, supra note 98, at 35-36; see also Segal, supra note 206 
(discussing unique issues in mediation when collective bargaining agreements are involved). 
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cation will determine the success of the system.233 Still, initial 
classification should not be determinative if later investigation 
reveals additional information. After the initial assessment, 
mediation should be offered to the parties in appropriate cases. 
The time period for mediation should be limited, 234 and absent 
settlement, the case should be returned to its place in the investi-
gation queue. 235 
Unlike agency programs, private mediation programs, unless 
they receive referrals from government agencies or employers, have 
little control over the timing of mediation. An employer instituting 
a program would be wise to encourage early mediation, with an 
exchange of information to insure fairness.236 Employment 
problems can quickly escalate to complex disputes, which impose 
significant costs on the employer and the employee. 237 Thus, 
early identification of problems with a mediation option may 
provide benefits to the employer and employee alike.238 
3. Fairness. Both actual and perceived fairness are crucial to 
any ADA mediation program. If mediation is not fair, particularly 
to individuals with disabilities, it frustrates rather than furthers 
the statutory goal of eliminating discrimination. Moreover, 
233 Staff members must be particularly cautious when dealing with unsophisticated or 
inarticulate complainants who may be unaware of the evidence relevant to establishing a 
violation of the law. 
234 Time limits will discourage parties from using mediation for delay purposes and will 
further the goal of speedy case processing. The time period for mediation must be adequate 
to allow for scheduling the mediation and for thoroughly exploring settlement possibilities 
through the mediator. The EEOC pilot project used a 60-day period. 
235 Agency employees should not be penalized for investigation delays resulting from a 
"time out" for mediation. To avoid discouraging mediation, however, such cases should bo 
given the same investigation priority they had before the parties opted for mediation. 
Furthermore, to encourage participation in mediation, the classification for further 
investigation purposes should not be revealed to the parties. Moreover, agencies should not 
deny mediation based on their views of the merits at the intake interview unless evaluation 
of the mediation program results suggests that the effectiveness of mediation is related to 
the initial assessment of the merits. 
238 A program that is fair to employees not only benefits the employer through improved 
morale, but also aids the employer should the employee later attempt to challenge tho 
agreement either by filing a charge with an agency or by filing a lawsuit. Simon & 
Sochynsky, supra note 126, at 34. 
237 PHILLIPS, supra note 129, at 155-57. 
238 See PHILLIPS, supra note 129, at 155-63 (discussing reasons employer should consider 
mediation); Bompey & Siniscalco, supra note 8, at 34-36 (same); Simon & Sochynsky, supra 
note 126, at 30 (same). 
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perceived fairness is necessary to induce both participation and 
settlement. The EEOC has recognized that fairness requires 
adequate information, the opportunity for assistance, knowing and 
voluntary participation, neutrality, confidentiality and enforceabili-
ty; the Agency's ADR programs will be developed in accordance 
with these principles. The ACUS Recommendation contains similar 
elements. 239 
a. Voluntary Participation. Both the EEOC program and the 
ACUS Recommendation provide for voluntary mediation. Private 
mediations of ADA claims also will be voluntary, except when an 
employer mandates mediation of statutory claims as a condition of 
employment.240 Arguably, mandatory mediation is inappropriate 
because mediation requires an openness to settlement found only 
in voluntary participants.241 On the other hand, mediation 
advocates argue that mediation is so effective that even involuntary 
participants can reach a satisfactory agreement. 242 
The latter proposition in fact may argue against involuntary 
mediation for statutory claims because parties unwittingly may 
sacrifice legal rights in mandatory mediation. Mandatory media-
tion in civil rights claims is not without precedent, however. In the 
late 1970s, the EEOC's rapid charge process (RCP) system required 
Commission staff to conduct a limited preliminary investigation of 
charges filed and schedule a factfinding conference with both 
parties.243 The EEOC representative served as a moder-
ator/advisor, with the goal of encouraging settlement. Any 
settlement reached was embodied in an agreement signed by the 
parties and the EEOC. If the parties did not settle, the evidence 
from the investigation and the conference was used to make a 
determination of cause. In effect, this process became nonconfiden-
tial mediation using an internal agency mediator. A General 
239 Information, the opportunity for assistance, nnd neutrnlity nre n1so elements of the 
Due Process Protocol Diu! Process Protocol, supra note 202, at E-11. 
240 Because the Task Force members failed to agree, the Due Process Protocol did not take 
a position on whether private arbitration and mediation should be voluntary or mandatory. 
Diu! Process Protocol, supra note 202, at E-11. However, the Task Force agreed that consent 
to arbitrate or mediate should be made knowingly. Id. 
241 MOORE, supra note 7, at 19; Kresse! & Pruitt, supra note 173, at 403. 
242 PHILLIPs, supra note 129, at 33 n.4. 
243 See EEOC Req!U!St for Comments on Alternative Dispute Resolution, supra note 95, at 
G-1 (describing rapid charge processing system). 
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Accounting Office report found that the system improved charge 
processing by resolving complaints more quickly.244 Nevertheless, 
the report criticized the EEOC both for obtaining settlements in 
cases without a reasonable basis to believe the charge was 
meritorious and for accepting settlements with little substance. 245 
This report raised a concern as to whether rapid resolution 
sacrifices equitable resolution, a particular problem when the 
parties have unequal bargaining power.246 
Moreover, the Chicago Commission on Human Relations also 
uses mandatory mediation for all cases in which it has found 
substantial evidence of a violation.247 The mediators, attorneys 
with experience in discrimination law and training in mediation, 
are paid by the Commission and no fee is charged to the parties for 
mediation. From September 1993 through September 1994, 
approximately 50% of all mediated cases settled, while 77% of the 
disability cases settled.248 Absent settlement, a case is scheduled 
for an administrative hearing. 
In disability cases, the Commission also employs a disability 
evidentiary conference.249 This mandatory conference, which 
serves both factfinding and settlement purposes, is employed when 
the Commission determines, based on a preliminary investigation, 
that the respondent's facilities are not fully accessible to the 
244 PEER Study, supra note 171, at 7-8. 
245 Silver, supra note 180, at 543 (citing COMPTROLLER GENERAL, FlmTHER IMPROVEMENTS 
NEEDED IN EEOC ENFORCEMENT ACTMTIES 12-15 (1981)). 
246 Id. at 542. 
247 Letter from Miriam I. Pickus, Deputy Commissioner, Chicago Commission on Human 
Relations, to Ann C. Hodges 1 (Sept. 13, 1994) (on file with author); Rules and Regulations 
Governing the Chicago Human Rights Ordinance, the Chicago Fair Housing Ordinance, and 
the Chicago Comm'n on Human Relations Enabling Ordinance (City of Chicago Commission 
on Human Relations 1992) [hereinafter Chicago Rules]. The Commission has jurisdiction in 
the City of Chicago over discrimination in employment, public accommodation, and housing, 
including discrimination based on disability. Id.§ 210.110 (establishing jurisdiction); id. pt. 
300 (covering employment discrimination), id. pt. 400 (covering housing discrimination); id. 
pt. 500 (covering discrimination in public accommodations). 
246 The actual number of disability cases has been small. From 1991 to 1993, tho 
Commission found substantial evidence in 36 disability cases involving employment and 
public accommodation. Twenty-eight were settled, with four cases still pending as of 
September 1994. Letter from Miriam I. Pickus, supra note 247, at 1-2. When all disability 
cases are considered, 57% of employment cases settled as did 66% of accommodation cases. 
Id. These settlements include those reached at disability evidentiary conferences. 
249 See Chicago Rules, supra note 247, at subpt. 525. 
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complainant.250 Prior to the conference, the respondent files an 
affidavit evidencing undue hardship, and the complainant files a 
responsive affidavit. 251 At the conference, a conciliator attempts 
to resolve the dispute; if no settlement is reached, the conciliator 
submits to the Commission's compliance staff a recommendation of 
whether substantial evidence of a violation should be found.252 
While the actual number of disability cases settled by the 
Chicago Commission has been relatively small, the procedure 
demonstrates that mandatory mediation can result in settlement. 
In each of the cases, however, the Commission had already found 
either substantial evidence of a violation or a lack of fully accessi-
ble facilities. Accordingly, the incentive for respondents to settle 
would seem to be greater than at the preliminary investigation 
stage. Similarly, Connecticut's anti-discrimination statute recently 
was amended to authorize the Connecticut Commission on Human 
Rights and Opportunities to conduct mandatory mediation of 
discrimination claims at the investigation stage.253 No evidence 
of the amendment's effectiveness is yet available. 
Neither the ADA nor the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act 
clearly authorizes mandatory mediation, but the ADA expressly 
authorizes voluntary mediation.254 The legislative history of the 
ADA indicates that the encouragement of alternative dispute 
resolution was not intended "to preclude rights and remedies that 
would otherwise be available to persons with disabilities."255 
Further, the conference report on the ADA states that "it is the 
intent of the conferees that the use of . . . alternative dispute 
250 Id. 
251 Id. As with the ADA. proof of undue hardship eliminntes the respondent.'s obligation 
to accommodate. Id. § 520.100. 
252 Id. § 525.115. If the staff finds substantial evidence, it mny waive the normal 
conciliation conference and proceed directly to an administrative hearing. Id. § 525.120. 
253 1994 Conn. Acts 238 (Reg. Sess.). The statute permits dismissal of the complaint if 
the complainant fails to attend mediation without good cause and entry of nn order of default 
against a respondent for the same conduct. Id. 
Some states have begun to use mandatory mediation of workers' compensntion claims. See 
generally Larson, supra note 218 (discussing mediation of workers' compensntion cases in 
North Carolina and comparing process with that in other states using mediation). 
254 42 U.S.C. § 12212 (Supp. V 1993). 
255 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF PuBuc LAW 101-336, THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES 
Ac:r 516-17 (Comm. Print 1990). 
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resolution is completely voluntary."256 This legislative history 
supports the conclusion that ADR should be voluntary.257 
Mediation does not preclude any rights and remedies, however, for 
if no agreement is reached in mediation, all other rights and 
remedies are still available. In addition, both congressional 
statements reference arbitration, directly or indirectly, suggesting 
congressional concern with compulsory arbitration rather than 
mediation. Accordingly, it might be argued that mandatory 
mediation is permissible under the statute. 
While the lack of an exhaustion requirement under either Title 
II or Title III suggests plaintiffs cannot be compelled by the 
administrative agency to mediate cases under those Titles,258 
mandated mediation may be an option under Titles I and IV, which 
do include such a requirement. The EEOC's rapid charge process-
ing system mandated participation in a mediation conference in 
Title VII cases, and because Title I adopts Title VIl's procedures, 
mandatory mediation may be available. 
As previously noted, the argument for mandatory mediation is 
based on a belief in the value of the process: parties that would not 
voluntarily mediate may settle in mandatory mediation and be 
satisfied with the process. 259 Mandatory mediation may be more 
efficient and therefore may reduce an agency's investigation 
backlog more quickly.260 On the other hand, if settlement is not 
reached or would have been reached without mediation, mediation 
may simply increase the costs to the parties and the govern-
266 H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 596, lOlst Cong., 2d Seas. 89 (1990), quoted in Stephen L. 
Hayford, The Coming Third Era of Labor Arbitration, 48 ARB. J. 8, 16 (1993). 
257 42 U.S.C. § 12212. The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act also authorizes 
administrative agencies to use voluntary dispute resolution proceedings. 5 U.S.C. § 572 
(1994). 
258 Because there is no requirement to file an administrative complaint or to wait for 
administrative action, the plaintiff could not be compelled to delay judicial action pending 
mediation. 
259 See Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution, Mandated Participation and 
Settlement Coercion: Dispute Resolution as it Relates to the Courts 12-13 (1991) (hereinafter 
SPIDR Report). Reluctance to mediate may result from lack of knowledge about the process 
or fear of appearing weak. Id. If the parties truly have no interest in settlement, however, 
mandatory mediation wastes the time and resources of the parties, the mediator, and tho 
agency. 
260 Id. at 2, 12-13. 
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ment.261 Furthermore, disabled individuals who would be 
disadvantaged by mediation262 would necessarily suffer if com-
pelled to mediate.263 Finally, a large-scale mediation program 
may become so mechanical that the benefits of mediation are 
lost.264 Given these concerns, and the cost of establishing a 
program requiring mediation in every case,255 the EEOC has 
wisely chosen to begin with voluntary mediation. Ongoing 
assessment of voluntary mediation efforts should reveal whether 
mandatory mediation might be effective.266 
Employer-mandated mediation raises slightly different issues. 
261 Id. at 1, 13. The emotional costs to the parties also may be increo.sed. Id. at 1. 
262 See supra notes 185-186 and accompanying text (discussing potentinl dmwbacks of 
mediation for some individuals). 
263 PEER Study, supra note 171, at 151; SPIDR Report, supra note 259, at 1-2. 
264 SPIDRReport, supra note 259, at 13-14; see also Judith Resnik. Many Doors? Closing 
Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolutwn andAqjudicatwn, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. REsoL. 211, 
262-63 (1995) (noting institutionalization of ADR may transform it into adversarinl process 
it was attempting to avoid). 
265 Moreover, statutory amendments would be necessary to authorize agencies to impose 
effective penalties for a respondent's failure to participate, as the ADA currenUy does not 
permit enforcement agencies to impose penalties for noncompliance. 
268 Should mandatory mediation be considered, the SPIDR Report's criteria for mandatory 
mediation, see SPIDR Report, supra note 259, should be followed. 
Another option is to mandate participation for respondents when the complninnnt agrees 
to mediation. This approach would avoid compelling participation by individuals with 
disabilities who feel they would be disadvantaged in mediation, while providing the benefits 
of increased use of mediation. For example, in farmer-creditor disputes, mediation is rarely 
used unless the lender is required to mediate at the farmer's request. PHILLIPS, supra note 
129, at 34 n.4; SINGER, supra note 223, at 95-98. Many of the mediation projects discussed 
herein also show that while a large number of complainants agree to mediate, far fewer 
respondents do so. E.g., EEOC Report on ADR Pilot Program, supra note 99, at 3. 
Requiring respondents to mediate would increase participation in the program and should 
be considered if participation in voluntary mediation is limited. 
However, agencies should recognize that if most complainants agree to mediate, project 
costs will increase. If necessary, this could be offset by fewer referrals to mediation. For 
example, if analysis of project results demonstrates that particular cases nrc more likely to 
settle in mediation, a program might only compel respondents in those cases to mediate. 
This option might be criticized as unfair because it compels only one party to mediate. 
Given the inherent imbalance of power between individuals and institutions, however, such 
compulsion might be justified. Moreover, individuals may be compelled by factors other than 
an agency mandate to try mediation, such as a desire to get the case resolved for economic 
reasons, particularly when investigations and litigation typically take years longer than 
mediation. Thus, compulsion may be less one-sided than initially apparent. Furthermore, 
because mediation actually may be in an institution's long-term interest.. mandatory 
mediation may benefit the organization despite its management.. which may oo Matuck in a 
short-term perspective." PHILLIPS, supra note 129, at 34 n.4. 
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While the arguments supporting mandatory mediation above apply 
equally to employer-mandated mediation, such mediation may 
deprive an individual of the statutorily created forum for relief from 
discrimination. While mediation is less risky than arbitration in 
this respect because it does not impose a binding solution, the 
employer's inherently superior power may nonetheless coerce an 
employee into a "voluntary" settlement having the same preclusive 
effect. 267 If the mediation follows the Due Process Protocol, the 
risk of an employee waiving her statutory rights is reduced, but is 
not eliminated. 
An employee dissatisfied with a mediated settlement still may 
file a charge with the EEOC. The Agency has indicated it will 
process charges regardless of the existence of an employer-spon-
sored ADR program. 268 Where a mediation agreement has been 
reached, but the employee is dissatisfied, the EEOC should 
investigate to determine whether to proceed. If it determines that 
reasonable cause exists, it must decide whether to litigate. If the 
EEOC does not feel the settlement adequately remedied the 
discrimination, it should litigate the case absent an adequate 
conciliation agreement.269 Regardless, the Agency should issue 
a right-to-sue letter, providing the employee with an opportunity to 
convince the court that the mediated agreement should not bar his 
267 See supra note 128 and accompanying text (discussing implications of employer· 
mandated binding arbitration); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36, 52 n.15 (1974) 
(holding individual can waive Title VII rights through voluntary and knowing settlement); 
see also SPIDR Meeting Highlights Arbitration Issues, 150 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 4, at 
112, 115 (Sept. 25, 1995) (noting argument of ACLU attorney that employees without counsel 
are significantly disadvantaged in mediation and arbitration because they negotiate without 
knowing what their claim is worth); Howard, supra note 163, at 285-87 (discussing waiver 
of statutory forum). 
268 See supra note 119 and accompanying text (discussing Motion 4 and EEOC's concern 
with voluntary internal ADR programs). Of course, the charge must be timely unless a basis 
exists to assert either that the statute of limitations was tolled by the mediation process or 
that the employer is estopped from asserting the statute of limitations defense. The 
Supreme Court has held that Title VIl's time limits are not jurisdictional, Zipes v. Trans 
World Airlines, 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982), and are subject to the equitable doctrines of tolling, 
waiver, and estoppal. Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345 (1983). Because the 
ADA adopts Title VIl's procedural requirements, this doctrine should equally apply. 
Nevertheless, the EEOC should be careful to ensure that private or employer-sponsored 
mediation does not become a vehicle for avoiding statutory liability. 
269 The need for injunctive relief should be an important consideration in the Agency's 
decision. A private mediation agreement may fail to provide appropriate injunctive relief. 
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judicial action. 
To encourage creation of fair and equitable private dispute-
resolution procedures, the EEOC should formally publish guidelines 
indicating the circumstances under which the Agency will defer to 
private dispute resolution procedures.270 Employers and private 
dispute resolution agencies should follow the guidelines when 
establishing their ADR programs. Such guidelines will further the 
goal of government efficiency by increasing the number of cases in 
which governmental enforcement is unnecessary. In the absence 
of formal guidelines, both the EEO C's own policy for ADR programs 
and the Due Process Protocol provide useful guides. 
b. Knowing Participation. Information about mediation is both 
an element of fairness and a prerequisite to eliciting effective 
participation in any mediation program. In order to make an 
informed choice about whether to participate in mediation, the 
potential parties need information about the mediation process, 
statutory rights and remedies, and the advantages and disadvan-
tages of both mediation and litigation. Availability of information 
to both parties will help to offset power differentials and to insure 
that participation is informed and effective. 
Administrative agencies can provide such information in both 
written and oral form. Written material setting forth the above 
information should be prepared and distributed to the parties for 
consideration in deciding whether to mediate.271 In addition, 
agency personnel should clearly understand the process and be 
committed to its use so that, when appropriate, they can provide 
information to the parties orally to supplement or confirm the 
written information. 272 
In addition to assisting parties in the decisionmaking process, 
providing information will promote satisfaction by creating realistic 
270 See Samuel Estreicher, Arbitration of Employment Disputes Without Unions, 66 Cm.-
KENT L. REv. 753, 790 (1990) (suggesting that EEOC issue regulations containing minimum 
procedural safeguards for arbitration of statutory claims). 
271 The Department of Justice has begun this process through its mediator training grant. 
which includes production of a consumer guide to mediation services. Many private 
mediation agencies also have prepared written information about the process. 
272 EEOC Report on ADR Pilot Program, supra note 99, at 4-5; Designing Systems, supra 
note 209, § m, at 1, 4; EEOC Mediation Program Evaluation, supra note 100, at 12-13, 25-
26. 
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expectations about the mediation process and its potential re-
sults. 273 This educative process is appropriate for private 
mediation agencies and employers as well, although internal 
education on mediation presumably is not necessary for mediation 
agencies. 
Further, the administrative agencies and private agencies 
adopting ADR programs can make potential users of mediation 
aware of its benefits by making presentations to groups, such as 
disability organizations, employer organizations, government 
agencies, and business groups. Persons who have used the 
procedure successfully also may become its proponents.274 Suc-
cessful mediations should be publicized to the extent possible to 
encourage further use.276 Finally, if the potential disputants 
themselves are trained in mediation matters, not only will they 
better understand the system, but they are more likely to advocate 
its use.276 
In addition to information about the mediation process itself, the 
receipt and timing of information exchanges between the parties 
prior to and during mediation are critical issues. Neither the 
EEOC program nor the ACUS Recommendation addresses this 
issue directly. The Due Process Protocol, however, recommends 
that employees and their representatives should have access to all 
information and documentation "reasonably relevant to mediation 
... of their claims. "277 
Depending on the timing of the mediation, the exchange of 
information may dramatically impact the chances for settle-
ment. 278 For example, a complainant may not have access to 
information about treatment of similarly situated individuals 
without disabilities, which may help prove or disprove the claim of 
273 EEOC Report on ADR Pilot Program, supra note 99, at 5; PEER Study, supra note 
171, at 152-53; Designing Systems, supra note 209, § III, at 1. 
274 URY ET AL., supra note 174, at 76. For example, businesses successfully involved in 
mediation might be willing to speak about their experience to business organizations. A 
potential source of support is the Better Business Bureau, which has been a leader in 
establishing ADR programs and also has been working in ADA education. 
276 Id. at 77. 
276 Id. at 78-79. 
277 Due Process Protocol, supra note 202, at E-11. 
278 See supra notes 227-228 and accompanying text (discussing effects of timing on 
information exchange in mediation). 
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discrimination. Similarly, management personnel involved in 
mediation may be unaware of negative statements made by a 
supervisor about an employee's disability, suggesting an improper 
motive in the supervisor's termination recommendation. A 
knowledgeable and effective mediator should be able to elicit this 
information and use it to craft a settlement which is fair to both 
parties. If the mediator fails to do so, not only is settlement less 
likely, but any settlement that is reached is less likely to be fair to 
both parties and consistent with the ADA, 279 thus reducing the 
value of the mediation program for both the government and the 
parties. 
If agency-sponsored mediation occurs early in the investigative 
process, an exchange of relevant information designed to facilitate 
mediation should be required. Alternatively, the agency could leave 
the issue of information exchange to the mediator, who can 
determine what information is necessary on a case-by-case 
basis.280 Requiring an information exchange removes a disadvan-
tage of mediation relative to litigation, where discovery is available, 
and may be necessary for truly effective bargaining. Regardless of 
which approach to information is taken, this issue should be 
addressed in evaluation of the program, and the design of the 
program should be altered if necessary to increase the probability 
and fairness of settlement.281 
m Like procedural information, availability of substantive information about the facts of 
the case serves to balance power. 
280 The mediator must be aware ofinformation relevant to nn ADA discrimirultion claim, 
thus underscoring the need for ADA training for mediators. See infra notes 295-302 nnd 
accompanying text (further discussing mediator training). The drawback of leaving the 
information exchange to the mediator is that if the parties refuse, the mediation may be 
futile. On the other hand, the mediator can tailor the exchange to the issues that arise in 
the case. An option to an all-or-nothing mediator determination is nn agency-mandated 
exchange of certain information, such as the charging party's statement, the employee's 
personnel file, and other typically relevant data, while leaving supplemental information-
exchange decisions to the mediator. 
281 The same concerns about information generally apply U> private and employer-
sponsored mediation programs. While an employer might be tempted, for self-protection 
purposes, U> avoid exchanges of information, a program that includes information exchnnge 
is better for employee morale, more likely U> be utilized, and more likely U> withstand legal 
challenge by an employee who files an EEOC charge or a lawsuit in spite of a mediated 
agreement. Moreover, because the information will be discoverable in any subsequent 
litigation, providing it early may lead U> quicker setUement, thereby minimizing litigation 
costs. 
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c. The Opportunity for Assistance. Like information, represen-
tation for both parties may serve to balance power. In many cases, 
the employer will be represented by legal counsel while the 
employee will not. 282 Even where legal counsel is not involved, 
the employer may bring a group of high-level executives and 
supervisors to the mediation while the employee appears alone. 
Alternatively, a small, unrepresented employer might be faced with 
a disability rights organization having expert legal counsel.283 In 
either case, the unrepresented party is likely to be, or at least to 
feel, disadvantaged. 284 That actuality or feeling may either 
reduce the probability of reaching an agreement or increase the 
probability that an agreement either sacrifices legal rights without 
effective compensation or is, upon reflection, unsatisfactory to the 
unrepresented party.285 In either case, effective dispute resolu-
tion has not occurred. 
The EEOC policy states that fairness requires providing the 
"opportunity for assistance during the proceeding to any party who 
is not represented. "286 The meaning of this statement is unclear: 
Will the EEOC provide advice or information? Will it appoint a 
representative for unrepresented parties? Will it provide a list of 
possible representatives to parties? Or will the Agency merely 
suggest that parties bring their own representation? 
282 Comments Regarding Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution and Negotiated 
Rulemaking Procedures 2 (Eastern Paralyzed Veterans Ass'n, Sept. 10, 1993) (on file with 
author). Interestingly, in 45% of the mediations in the EEOC Pilot Project, neither party 
was represented by an advocate. EEOC Mediation Program Evaluation, supra note 100, at 
43. Thus, the imbalance of representation may be a concern in fewer cases than might 
initially be expected. 
283 Letter from John J. Motley III, Vice President, Federal Governmental Relations, 
National Federation of Independent Business, to Office of the Executive Secretariat, Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission 1 (Sept. 22, 1993) (on file with author). 
284 For a discussion of the numerous issues to be considered in negotiating the settlement 
of a complex employment dispute illustrating the need for representation, see Cary R. 
Singletary et al., Securing a Durable Mediation Agreement to Settle Complex Employment 
Disputes, 46 LAB. L.J. 223 (1995). 
285 For example, one party may be intimidated into an agreement it later regrets; 
consequently, that party may refuse to comply or may renew efforts to pursue its claim, thus 
magnifying the dispute rather than resolving it. 
286 EEOC Policy Statement, supra note 189, at E-13. The Due Process Protocol also sets 
forth a right to representation. Due Process Protocol, supra note 202, at E-11. 
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At a minimum, both government and private mediation agencies 
should encourage the parties to bring a knowledgeable representa-
tive to mediation. Such a representative need not be an attorney. 
For example, the group trained through the joint EEOC-DOJ 
program may provide potential advocates for complainants. Such 
training could be repeated or expanded, and technical assistance 
grants could be used to encourage disability and business organiza-
tions to provide such training as well.287 Additionally, the agen-
cies should consider maintaining lists of organizations providing 
advocacy services for use by parties seeking representation. 288 
Alternatively, an agency staff person knowledgeable about the 
ADA could serve as a resource for unrepresented parties. This 
person should have no role in the mediation, investigation, or 
litigation of the case. Moreover, she should provide only informa-
tion, not legal advice. An individual performing initial case 
screening could serve this function. 289 
An alternative to use of legal representation to balance power, 
which will also minimize legalization of the mediation process, is 
287 Some training efforts have been initiated already. For example, in Februnry 1995, the 
Department of Rights ofVrrginians with Disabilities presented a self.advocacy workshop on 
Titles II and ill of the ADA, designed to teach individuals with disabilities, family members, 
and advocates about ADA rights and responsibilities, so they might achieve compliance for 
themselves and others with disabilities. Access to Programs and Services: A Self Advocacy 
Workshop on Titles II & ill of the Americans with Disabilities Act CADA) (Dep't of Rights of 
Vrrginians With Disabilities, Feb. 1995) (on file with author). 
288 PEER Study, supra note 171, at 184. At one time, the EEOC maintained attorney 
referral lists for charging parties. One of the EEOC offices in the pilot mediation program 
compiled a list of volunteer labor lawyers to consult with unrepresented charging parties who 
desired advice during adjournments of mediation. EEOC Mediation Program Evaluation, 
supra note 100, at 11. Any list should be carefully maintained, however, to ensure it 
contains only those currently interested in representation; otherwise, it will act only to 
frustrate the person seeking representation. 
The Due Process Protocol recommends that the mediation procedure should include 
reference to organizations that might provide assistance, such as bar associations, legal 
services organizations, civil rights organizations, and labor unions. Due Process Protocol, 
supra note 202, at E-11. 
289 Alternatively, this function could be undertaken by technical assistance staff. This 
might generate accusations of agency bias, however. One EEOC office in the pilot mediation 
program made staff personnel available to answer questions from either party both during 
and before mediation. EEOC Mediation Program Evaluation, supra note 100, at 11. 
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to limit the role of attorneys. 290 Parties normally having legal 
representation, however, might be reluctant to mediate without 
counsel, and although lawyers generally are becoming more 
receptive to ADR, counsel might advise clients to avoid mediation 
when they are not permitted to participate. In fact, having lawyers 
in mediation may serve to protect parties' rights and to provide a 
buffer between adverse parties.291 Better approaches would be (1) 
to allow counsel to participate but to strongly encourage the 
unrepresented party to obtain representation and (2) to use 
mediation techniques to balance the power differentials. 292 
Analysis of the EEOC Pilot Program confirmed that when one 
party appeared with an unanticipated representative, the other 
party was concerned about the fairness of the process. The 
evaluator recommended that the Agency develop criteria specifying 
who may participate in a mediation session and at what point such 
decisions must be made.293 Accordingly, administrative agencies 
using mediation should establish guidelines as to the number of 
representatives permitted and time limits for notifying the 
mediator of the identity of the representatives. To avoid surprises 
and concerns about fairness, each party should then be notified as 
to who will be representing the other party. If one party identifies 
counsel, the other party should be permitted a short period of time 
to add an advocate to the list of identified representatives.294 
The same considerations that encourage representation in 
290 MOORE, supra note 7, at 107·08; PEER Study, supra note 171, at 36. Insufficient 
research exists to indicate whether lawyers help or hinder settlement prospects. MOORE, 
supra note 7, at 108. 
291 Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 
1545, 1597-1600 (1991). 
292 Because it is often difficult for complainants to obtain counsel, see Howard, supra note 
163, at 288, barring counsel might benefit some complainants. However, such a ban would 
not balance the power between employers and employees. On the whole, banning lawyers 
is not recommended. Some employer·created systems provide employer reimbursement for 
at least a portion of employee legal expenses, particularly for lower paid employees. D11e 
Process Protocol, supra note 202, at E-11. Such systems at least assist an employee in 
obtaining representation to review any agreement reached and likely lead to more 
satisfactory, enduring settlements. 
293 EEOC Report on ADR Pilot Program, supra note 99, at 5. 
294 Restrictions on representation are more problematic for private mediation agencies. 
Any such requirements should be established and communicated in advance, preferably with 
the parties' agreement. 
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government-sponsored mediation support the same approach for 
private agencies. In lieu of an agency staff person, private agencies 
should equip mediators with lists of referral resources to provide to 
the parties. These resources should include the appropriate 
government agency, as well as business and disability rights 
organizations. 
d. Neutrality. Fairness, according to the EEOC, requires use 
of a third party neutral having thorough knowledge of the law and 
training in mediation theory and techniques. The Due Process 
Protocol and the ACUS Recommendation adopt similar require-
ments. Private mediation agencies need only ensure their media-
tors are thoroughly trained in the ADA Government agencies 
additionally must determine the source of their mediators. The 
mediators must be trained in traditional mediation skills295 and 
in dealing with the power imbalances common to ADA claims.296 
Furthermore, ADA mediators must have a general understanding 
of various types of disabilities and the impact that such disabilities 
have on the lives of individuals.297 In particular, the mediator 
must understand the effect such disabilities may have on the 
dispute resolution process and the ways mediation may be made 
accessible to individuals with disabilities.298 Such training will 
minimize mediator bias resulting from fear of and ignorance about 
individuals with disabilities. Furthermore, such training will assist 
mediators in ensuring that individuals with disabilities can 
295 Qualifying Neutrals: The Basic Principles, Report of the SPIDR Commission on 
Qualifications 17-19 (Society for Profs. in Disp. Resol., Apr. 1989) [hereinafter SPIDR 
Commission on Qualifications Report] {on file with author). 
296 Mediation techniques exist to deal with power imbalances without compromising 
neutrality. MOORE, supra note 7, at 180-82. For example, the mediator can create doubts 
about actual power of the parties, assist the weaker party to mobilize the power that he 
possesses, or focus the mediation on interests rather than power. Id. at 280-82. The 
mediator can only attempt to balance the power to negotiate, however, not the inherent 
power differentials between employers and employees that exist regardless or forum. 
PHILLIPS, supra note 129, at 146; see David E. Matz, Mediatcr Pressure and Party Autonomy: 
Are They Consistent with Each Other?, 10 NEGOTIATION J. 359, 360 {1994) (noting that while 
mediation properly emphasizes autonomy, every party has limited time, energy, money, 
imagination and intelligence, as well as relationships with others, all or which constrain 
decisions). 
297 TARGETING DISABILITY NEEDS, supra note 98, at 20-28; SPIDR Commission on 
Qualifications Report, supra note 295, at 2-3. 
298 TARGETING DISABILITY NEEDS, supra note 98, at 22-37. 
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effectively participate in mediation and in finding solutions to the 
problems of accommodation and access. 299 
The mediator also must have an understanding of the legal 
ramifications of the ADA. 300 While the mediator is not a legal 
advisor to the parties, he must be aware of the legal context in 
which the dispute arises and the standards that would be applica-
ble if the case were litigated. 301 The mediator also must be 
299 See Delgado et al., supra note 185, at 1361 (noting ADR is designed to serve groups 
whose members are particularly vulnerable to prejudice); 136 CONG. REC. H4627 (daily ed. 
July 12, 1990) (statement of Rep. Oberstar) (noting much discrimination against individuals 
with disabilities is based on ignorance and fear); 136 CONG. REC. H4624 (July 12, 1990) 
(statement of Rep. Edwards) (same); 136 CONG. REC. H2444 (May 17, 1990) (statement of 
Rep. Rangel) (stating ignorance leads to closed doors for individuals with disabilities). Such 
education also can aid the mediator in learning to communicate with individuals with 
communication-based disabilities. If the mediator is unable to effectively and impartially 
deal with a particular disabled individual, she should decline to mediate. MOORE, supra note 
7, at 300. 
300 SPIDR Commission on Qualifications Report, supra note 295, at 19 (recommending use 
of mediators with expertise in statutory requirements and noting that special training would 
be required for the existing cadre oflabor and employment mediators to enable effective and 
fair mediation of statutory disputes in the workplace); Lawyers Committee Comments, supra 
note 169, at 3 (same); Due Process Protocol, supra note 202, at E-11. 
3-0t Some mediation scholars argue that subject matter expertise is irrelevant. E.g., 
Stephen B. Goldberg, A Qualified Mediator's Skills Don't Depend on Experience, NAT'L L.J., 
Apr. 11, 1994, at C14. An expert mediator certainly could resolve an ADA dispute without 
ADA expertise. Nevertheless, training in the ADA should be required. Where mediation is 
occurring pursuant to a referral from the enforcement agency, the mediated agreements 
should be reviewed by the agency for consistency with the statute. Therefore, the mediator 
must be sufficiently knowledgeable to ensure such consistency. Moreover, a knowledgeable 
mediator can assist in settlement by previewing the possible outcomes of a trial, enabling 
the parties to view their positions more realistically. Finally, because statutory rights are 
involved, the mediator should be sufficiently knowledgeable to alert unsophisticated parties 
to statutory issues. But see Leda M. Cooks, Putting Mediation in Context, 11 NEGOTIATION 
J. 91, 96 (1995) (noting emphasis on rights in mediation relies on mediators who are experts 
in system that mediation is designed to replace). 
However, members of the dispute resolution community disagree about the role of tho 
mediator in this respect. See, e.g., MOORE, supra note 7, at 34-35, 40-42 (discussing various 
conceptions ofrole of mediator); James B. Boskey, The Proper Role of the Mediator: Rational 
Assessment, Not Pressure, 10 NEGOTIATION J. 367, 367-70 (1994) (same); Bush, supra note 
177, at 259-62 (same). One view of mediation limits the role of the mediator to obtaining a 
settlement on any terms agreeable to the parties. Under this view, the mediator should not 
impose upon the parties her own assessment of the merits of the case, the merits of any 
proposals offered, or the merits of the settlement reached. Under an alternative view, tho 
mediator plays a more active role in informing the parties of the applicable law and attempts 
to settle the dispute in light of the legal rights of the parties. This view, known as "rights· 
based mediation," has been suggested as most appropriate for ADA mediation. E.g., 
TARGETING DISABILITY NEEDS, supra note 98, at 9-10. A third view is that mediation is 
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knowledgeable about available resources in the community at the 
national, state, and local levels which can aid in reaching a 
satisfactory settlement. 302 These resources may be able to pro-
vide solutions to accessibility and accommodation problems or may 
offer services that will assist in determining or providing such 
solutions. Use of such resources may determine the outcome of the 
mediation. 
Several other factors must be considered by ADA enforcement 
agencies in determining the best source or sources of mediators. 
Mediation should be provided cost-free to the parties, as any charge 
might discourage its use.303 Mediator cost to the agency, train-
appropriate where empowerment is the goal, but not where efficiency or protection of rights 
is the objective. E.g., Bush, supra note 177, at 235·238. This Article docs not attempt to 
enter this debate; as proposed here, mediation attempts to further all three goals. The 
mediator should be aware of the statutory rights and remedies, however, and should ensure 
that the parties have the necessary statutory information to make mediation effective. or 
course, an effective agency education program will limit the need for a mediator to educate 
parties in this area. If the education and information are provided, each party will be able 
to determine its own interests, including both the direct and transactional costs of failure to 
agree. Boskey, supra, at 324. 
302 See TARGETING DISABILITY NEEDS, supra note 98, at 38-49 Oisting resources and 
offering suggestions on use of such resources). Through the technical assistance programs, 
the agencies have identified resources as well E.g., A TECHNICAL AsslSTANCE MANUAL ON 
THE EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISADILlTIES ACT, REsoURCE 
DIRECTORY (EEOC 1992). The information should be updated on a continual basis. Loeal 
area disability rights organizations or government agencies dealing with civil rights or 
disability issues might have, or be willing to compile, information about local resources for 
use in mediation. Furthermore, business groups may provide such resources. For example, 
a group of national companies have formed Project Access, which provides to businesses 
information on compliance with the ADA and resources for issues relating to employment 
of individuals with disabilities. PETER D. BLANCK, COMMUNICATING THE AMERICANS WITH 
DISABILITIES ACT, TRANsCENDING COMPLIANCE: A CASE REPORT ON SEARS, RoEBUCK AND 
Co. 21 (The Annenberg Washington Program, Communications Policy Studies of Northwest-
ern University, 1994) (on file with author). 
303 or course, the parties pay their own costs. Attorney's fees for mediation should be 
treated as any other administrative cost, and should be recoverable by a prevailing plaintiff 
if the case is eventually litigated. Cf. New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 
61 (1980) (stating Civil Rights Act authorizes awarding of attorney's fees in proceedings 
other than court actions). Mandatory mediation, if adopted, also should include costs to 
parties equivalent to those in regular case processing. SPIDR Report, supra note 259, at 16. 
A minimal charge for mediation might elicit more commitment to the process. See Bompey 
& Siniscalco, supra note 8, at 31 (noting employee has no stake in mediation proceeding if 
employer pays entire fee for mediation). On the other hand, any fee might discourage 
participation. In the EEOC Pilot Project, some respondents were asked to pay $300.00 for 
mediation. EEOC Mediation Program Evaluation, supra note 100, at 28. The respondents 
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ing costs, and availability for timely mediation also are essential in 
determining the best source of mediators. 
Agencies have four potential sources for obtaining mediators:304 
agency employees trained in mediation; trained employees from 
other agencies;305 mediators from the Federal Mediation and 
Conciliation Service (FMCS), which currently mediates labor 
disputes and cases under the Age Discrimination Act;306 and 
external, private mediators.307 Agency employees are familiar 
with the law and with the remedies that would result were the case 
to be litigated. Moreover, use of agency employees would facilitate 
agency control over the process. Most agency employees are not 
trained in mediation, however, and some may not be well-suited for 
such a role. Furthermore, employees at most ADA enforcement 
agencies are stretched to the limit, and imposition of additional 
duties would require additional staffing.308 Finally, some parties 
(particularly respondents) may be wary of revealing information to 
the very agency responsible for investigating statutory viola-
tions. 309 Thus, use of agency mediators might result in lower 
were twice as likely to mediate when there was no charge. Id. 
304 Regardless of the source of mediators, efforts should be made to include mediators 
with disabilities, thus furthering the ADA's goal of inclusion. In a comparable context, tho 
use of arbitration to decide statutory race and gender discrimination cases has been criticized 
for the demographic makeup of the available arbitrators, typically white and male. Howard, 
supra note 163, at 172. But see SPIDR Meeting Highlights Arbitration Issues, supra note 
267, at 112 (noting argument of ACLU attorney that diversity is not crucial in choosing 
mediators because individuals are not necessarily sympathetic to others from their own 
background). 
305 Inter-agency Pilot Project on Sharing Neutrals (Admin. Conf. U.S. 1994) [hereinafter 
Inter-agency Pilot Project] (on file with author); see also infra notes 311-314 and accompany-
ing text (discussing project). 
306 29 U.S.C. §§ 172, 173 (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 6103 (1988); 5 U.S.C. § 7119 (1994); 34 C.F.R. 
§ 110.32 (1995). 
307 See supra notes 103, 137, 144 and accompanying text (describing pilot projects using 
external mediators). 
308 Additionally, many agency personnel currently having ADA expertise are located in 
Washington, D.C., perhaps requiring additional expense for training or travel for face-to-face 
mediation. Mediation by telephone, while feasible, would likely be less effective. PEER 
Study, supra note 171, at 157; EEOC Mediation Program Evaluation, supra note 100, at 69, 
71. 
303 Letter from Jeffrey A. Norris, President, Equal Employment Advisory Council, to 
Frances M. Hart, Executive Officer, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 4 (Sept. 
16, 1993) (on file with author) (suggesting respondents would not be candid with agency 
officials who might ultimately sue the respondent). 
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participation rates, lower settlement rates, or settlements without 
full information. This is a greater concern when mediation is part 
of the investigatory process than when it is separate and confiden-
tial. a10 
The ACUS and a number of federal agencies have initiated a 
pilot project to promote sharing of mediators among federal 
agencies.311 The mediators in the project are trained federal 
employees who will mediate internal or external disputes for their 
own or other agencies on a collateral duty basis.312 This project 
offers trained and experienced mediators at low cost.313 However, 
at present, the mediators are located in the Washington, D.C. 
metropolitan area only,314 and they are not specifically trained in 
the ADA While the training concern is remediable, the geographic 
limitations would require either the mediator or the parties to 
travel for face-to-face mediation. 
FMCA mediators, the third option, are stationed around the 
country, thus avoiding the geographical problems of using other 
agency personnel. There is, however, some debate among media-
tion scholars as to whether the approach to mediation used by the 
FMCS in labor disputes is appropriate in civil rights disputes.315 
In labor disputes, settlements reflect the power of the parties. A 
labor contract negotiation is, in essence, a power contest. Media-
tion of a civil rights dispute, however, involves the external 
310 Even when mediation is confidential, the parties may not be convinced that 
information disclosed in mediation will not be revealed to agency investigators or attorneys. 
Moreover, with certain exceptions, agency records are subject to the Freedom of Information 
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994) (FOIA). See Philip J. Harter, Neither Cop nor Co!leclion Agent: 
Encouraging Administrative Settlements by Ensuring Mediator Confidentiality, 41 ADMIN. 
L. REv. 315, 338-41 (1989) (discussing mediation and FOIA). 
311 See Inter-Agency Pilot Project, supra note 305, at 1. The fate of this project is 
uncertain in light of the termination of ACUS. 
312 Id.; Pilot Project on Sharing Neutrals, ADR NET\VORK. June 1994, at 1, 12 (on file with 
author). 
313 Inter-agency Pilot Project, supra note 305, at 2. Because the mediators a.re expected 
to mediate internal EEO complaints, their experience will be somewhat relevant to ADA 
disputes. Pilot Project on Sharing Neutrals, supra note 312, at 12. The Pilot Project 
anticipates expanding the corps of available neutrals by using less-experienced mediators as 
co-mediators, enabling them to gain experience to mediate alone. Inter-agency Pilot Project. 
supra note 305, at 2. 
314 Inter-agency Pilot Project, supra note 305, at 1. The mediators in the Pilot Project will 
work within a sixty-mile radius of Washington, D.C. Id. 
315 MOORE, supra note 7, at 40-42. 
490 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:431 
standards of the statute. On that basis, FMCS mediators arguably 
are inappropriate for the task of mediation in the context of 
statutory rights, at least without some assurance that the media-
tors could make the transition in mediation approach. Although 
FMCS mediators do have some experience in mediating statutory 
civil rights cases under the Age Discrimination Act, 316 they would 
still require ADA training. 
Moreover, FMCS mediators may not be readily available. 
Currently, the first priority of the FMCS is mediation of labor 
disputes. These disputes are likely to receive first priority absent 
contrary congressional direction because a great number of people 
are impacted by such disputes, timeliness is critical, and the 
mediators will likely be more inclined to mediate the types of 
disputes for which they joined the Agency and in which they are 
experienced. Accordingly, without a significant infusion of 
additional mediators, timely mediation of ADA cases by the FMCS 
is unlikely. 
The final option is the use of outside mediators. The two pilot 
projects have trained a group of mediators in ADA issues and the 
1994 DOJ grant contemplates training an additional ninety 
mediators. Thus, a group of mediators trained in both mediation 
and the ADA exists and will soon increase in size.317 Accordingly, 
use of outside mediators would minimize training costs318 and 
avoid increasing government employment, furthering the current 
316 42 U.S.C. § 6103; 34 C.F.R. § 110.32. A study of the mediation program found it 
difficult to evaluate because of the unavailability of data. Linda R. Singer & Ronald A. 
Schechter, Mediating Civil Rights: The Age Discrimination Act, 4 NAT'L INST. DISP. RESOL. 
11, 16, 19 (1986). 
317 The private agencies beginning mediation programs also will increase the pool of 
mediators. In addition, some of the mediators who have been working with state and local 
anti-discrimination agencies may be available. 
318 Training of additional mediators might be necessary if the volume of cases is large or 
if trained mediators are not available in all relevant geographic areas. The EEOC and DOJ 
Pilot Projects each were limited geographically to several large cities, but the forthcoming 
training project is expected to be more national in scope. In addition, each group of 
mediators would require some additional training to be able to handle disability cases under 
other titles. However, some issues are common to two or more titles. For example, a ramp 
may be necessary for both employees and customers. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(0), app. (1995) 
(noting accessibility to both work and nonwork areas is reasonable accommodation). 
Similarly, employment cases may arise under both Titles I and II, and information about 
resources will be useful for cases under Titles I, II, and III. 
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objective of limiting government bureaucracy through use of the 
private sector. Moreover, while outside mediators trained in the 
ADA are not yet available nationwide, there are mediators in many 
areas of the country who might be trained in ADA mediation. 319 
However, the use of outside mediators relinquishes some 
governmental control over the process and requires agency 
monitoring of nonemployees to ensure quality work. While an 
agency's employee performance controls do not affect outside 
mediators, a mediator's desire to remain active in the ADR 
community may provide sufficient incentive for compliance with 
quality standards. 
Moreover, unless a sufficient number of mediators are willing to 
work for free, they must be paid with government funds. Because 
local civil rights agencies have had some success in acquiring pro 
bono mediators, the possibility should not be overlooked.320 
Private mediators may see mediation of ADA cases pro bono or at 
low cost as a way to increase their experience and expand their 
client base. Agencies also should consider granting funds to 
existing mediation agencies.321 Moreover, these agencies often 
319 See Amy Hermanek, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act: Implementation 
of Mediation Programs for More Effective Use of the Act, 12 LAW & lNEQ. J. 457, 473-80 
(1994) (recommending use of community mediation dispute-resolution programs for Tille ill 
disputes); Letter from D. Gene Valentini, Director, Dispute Resolution Center, South Plains 
Ass'n of Govts., to Office of Executive Secretariat, Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission 1 (Sept. 17, 1993) (on file with author) (suggesting use of mediators from federal 
and local government agencies as means of handling more cases nnd fostering accessibility 
to mediation). Such mediators could be accessed through a contractual arrangement with 
one or more dispute resolution agencies or by maintaining a roster oftroined mediators. In 
addition, the ACUS maintains a roster of neutrals available for use in agency disputes. 
Thomas R. Colosi & Christopher G. Colosi, Managing Conflict with Mediation, in lli!EDIATJON: 
A PRIMER FOR FEDERAL AGENCIES 12. Finally, the American Arbitration Association will be 
providing training for neutrals on statutory issues in the spring 0£1996. EEOC Commission· 
er Criticizes Manda.Wry Arbitration, 10 Ind. Emp. Rights CBNA) No. 22, at 1 (Oct. 10, 1995). 
320 The D.C. Department of Human Rights uses volunteer mediators. Community dispute 
resolution centers frequently use volunteer mediators quite successfully. See Susan J. 
Rogers, Ten Ways to Work More Effectiuely with Volunteer Mediatoro, 7 NEGOTIATION J. 201 
(1991) (offering useful suggestions for effective use and motivation of volunteer mediators). 
Professor Lamont Stallworth, a dispute resolution professional from the Chicago Center for 
Employment Dispute Resolution, suggests that neutrals may have a professional obligation 
to take several cases each year pro bono. ADR Needed for Ciuil Rights Enforcement, 144 
Lab. Rel Rep. (BNA) No. 9, at 284 (Nov. 1, 1993). Lawyers trained in medintion might fulfill 
pro bono obligations by mediating cases. 
321 Such grants were used for the pilot projects. 
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are aware of sources of volunteer or low-cost mediators. 322 
None of the above sources of mediators is unquestionably 
superior to the others, assuming the mediators involved are 
adequately trained and a sufficient number of mediators exists to 
handle the cases in a timely fashion. However, use of outside 
mediators may enhance the acceptability of the mediation process 
to the parties, require less training, and provide necessary 
geographical diversity. Furthermore, development of a cadre of 
experienced private ADA mediators may encourage disputants to 
use mediation without filing charges with the agency, freeing 
agency resources and reducing governmental enforcement expendi-
tures. 
While the mediator in government-sponsored mediation presum-
ably will be assigned by the agency or the contractor operating the 
program,323 in private mediation, selection of the mediator or 
mediation agency is potentially problematic. To ensure neutrality, 
the mediator should be selected jointly through a specified proce-
dure known to both parties.324 Both parties should have informa-
tion regarding available mediators, including their training and 
experience. Additionally, employers beginning mediation programs 
must decide whether to use internal or external mediators and 
should consider the issues discussed above for government-spon-
sored programs. Although many companies use internal media-
tors, 325 employees undoubtedly will be more likely to question the 
neutrality of a company employee. 
As noted in the Due Process Protocol, "impartiality is best 
assured by the parties sharing the fees and expenses of the 
322 See also George D. Ruttinger,Acquiring the Services of Neutrals for Alternative Means 
of Dispute Resolution and Negotiated Rulemaking, in ADMINISTRATIVE CONF. OF U.S., 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS 1986, at 877-902 (Nov. 19, 1986) (identifying alternative 
means of funding mediation). 
323 Of course, no mediator should accept the appointment ifhe or she has any conflict of 
interest. See, e.g., MOORE, supra note 7, at 302 (indicating mediator should disclose all 
information relevant to actual or perceived conflict of interest and if bias may affect 
performance, mediator should decline to serve). 
324 See Due Process Protocol, supra note 202, at E-11 (recommending process used by 
American Arbitration Association or process using alternate strikes from list containing odd 
number of mediators). Alternatively, once the mediation agency is selected, it could be 
empowered to assign a mediator. 
325 GAO REPORT, supra note 126, at 3. 
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mediator."326 The Protocol recommends that when the goal of 
equal sharing is not possible, some arrangement should be made to 
achieve the goal as nearly as possible.327 For example, if a 
private agency arranges for the mediator, it could collect the 
payments and forward the fee to the mediator without disclosing 
the parties' shares. 328 While the concern for equal responsibility 
for costs is legitimate, mediator bias stemming from unequal 
sharing is a lesser risk than it would be in arbitration because the 
mediator cannot impose a decision on the parties.329 Neverthe-
less, every effort should be made in the selection process to ensure 
the fairness and impartiality of the mediator. 
e. Confidentiality. Confidentiality, a primary advantage of 
mediation, may motivate one or both parties to choose mediation 
over litigation.330 However, an enforcement agency using media-
tion might opt to make mediation a part of the investigation 
process, thereby eschewing confidentiality for efficiency. For 
example, in the EEOC's rapid charge process, the factfinding 
conference served both investigatory and settlement purposes, with 
the Agency facilitator acting as both investigator and mediator. 
The advantage of such an approach is that it avoids the duplication 
of effort required when mediation fails and the investigation must 
proceed. Despite this advantage, both the EEOC and the ACUS 
326 Due Process Protocol, supra note 202, at E-11. 
327 Presumably, this suggestion means allowing the employee to pay his or her share from 
any back pay received, through a no-interest loan from the employer, or through some other 
method. In some employer-sponsored programs, the employee is entitled to reimbursement 
for legal fees up to a specified amount. See OperaJu:m of Internal ADR Programs is 
Discussed, 150 Lab. ReL Rep. (BNA) No. 6, at 174-75 (Oct. 9, 1995) (describing Brown and 
Root program allowing employees to spend up to $2500 of company money for legal fees and 
noting that, of approximately 500 claims per year, only 55 employees have requested legal 
fees). In the Brown and Root system, employees who choose not to use lawyers preempt the 
use of company lawyers in arbitration and generally have prevailed. Id. Conversely, when 
employees obtained legal representation and were opposed by company lawyers, the 
employees generally lost. Id. 
328 Due Process Protocol, supra note 202, at E-11. 
329 The mediator can influence a party to accept a settlement, however, so every possible 
effort should be made to ensure impartiality. A similar concern is that the employer is more 
likely than the employee to be a repeat customer of the mediator. Peter M. Panken et al., 
Avoiding Employment Litigation: Alternative Dispute Resolution of Employment Disputes in 
the 90s, C779 ALI-ABA 63, 72 (1992). For the same reason, this is a greater concern in 
arbitration than in mediation. 
330 FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 11, at 35; SINGER, supra note 223, at 172. 
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Recommendation opt for confidentiality, insulating the mediator 
from the investigation and compliance process. 331 
Several factors support this decision. As noted, confidentiality 
may be an incentive to choose mediation. Moreover, candid 
participation in mediation increases the probability of settle-
ment.332 A party may be unwilling to reveal information benefi-
cial to settlement if that information can later be used in the 
investigation to the party's detriment.333 Maintaining confidenti-
ality also minimizes the possibility that a party will participate in 
mediation only as a form of discovery.334 Furthermore, the 
Administrative Dispute Resolution Act (ADRA) generally requires 
confidentiality in dispute resolution proceedings.336 Arguably, 
mediation still in the investigative stage is not a dispute resolution 
proceeding covered by the Act; nevertheless, the rationale support-
ing the Act's confidentiality provisions is persuasive and should be 
followed in ADA mediation.336 Confidentiality involves two other 
important aspects: protection from public disclosure and protection 
in later litigation from use of mediation-related information by the 
other party. Both are important to encouraging both participation 
in mediation and the openness and willingness to compromise 
necessary for successful mediation. 337 
There are limits to confidentiality, however, and both government 
agencies and private mediation agencies should make these limits 
clear to the parties prior to the decision to mediate. Notably, the 
use of information disclosed in mediation in judicial proceedings is 
governed by the law of the relevant jurisdiction; thus, confidentiali-
331 But see 29 C.F.R. § 1601.26(b) (1995) (allowing EEOC to use as evidence in subsequent 
proceedings factual information otherwise obtainable). 
332 MOORE, supra note 7, at 160; SINGER, supra note 223, at 171-72. The parties need to 
know that information disclosed to the mediator in caucus sessions will not be disclosed to 
the other party absent authorization. Recommendation 88-11 of the Administrative 
Conference of the United States, 41 ADMIN. L. REv. 357, 357-58 (1989) [hereinafter 
Recommendation 88-11]. 
333 Harter, supra note 310, at 324. 
334 Recommendation 88-11, supra note 332, at 358. 
335 5 u.s.c. § 574 (1994). 
336 See generally Harter, supra note 310 (discussing confidentiality issues thoroughly). 
337 FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 11, at 264-65; SINGER, supra note 223, at 171-72. In 
these two respects, the EEOC's regulations preserve the confidentiality of statements made 
and actions taken during informal efforts to eliminate unlawful employment practices. 29 
C.F.R. § 1601.26(a) (1995). 
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ty may not be assured,338 and in fact, complete confidentiality 
may not be desirable.339 Accordingly, while confidentiality should 
be the goal whether mediation is private or government-sponsored, 
the scope and limits of confidentiality should be clear to the 
mediating parties. Should the parties desire, they may make a 
specific agreement regarding confidentiality, talcing into account 
the possible need for evidence in any subsequent enforcement 
proceeding. 340 
f. Enforceability of Mediated Agreements. The goal of media-
tion is to settle cases; settlements are an effective method of 
statutory enforcement only if they are enforceable. While studies 
of mediation indicate that compliance with mediated agreements is 
widespread, a successful mediation program should result in legally 
enforceable agreements to better ensure such compliance. Judicial 
decisions involving enforcement of settlement agreements under 
Title VII, on which the enforcement provisions of Title I of the ADA 
are based, have reached varying results. Generally, courts have 
found federal jurisdiction to enforce predetermination settlement 
338 See FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 11, at 267-80 (discussing legal issues relating to 
confidentiality); SINGER, supra note 223, 172-73 (same); DISPUTE REsoLUTION, supra note 
174, at 179-90 (same). 
Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides some protection for mediation 
communications. It bars evidence of settlement offers and statements made during 
settlement negotiations to prove liability or invalidity of claims or to prove the amount of 
loss. FED. R. Evm. 408. For a discussion of Rule 408's limitations, as well as other 
protections of and limitations on confidentiality, see Harter, supra note 310, at 328-48. See 
also 5 U.S.C. § 574 (1994) (providing ADRA's requirements for confidentiality of dispute 
resolution communications and making communications disclosed in violation of provisions 
inadmissible in any proceeding relating to issues mediated); 29 C.F.R. § 160L26 (1995) 
(preserving generally confidentiality of communications in informal EEOC settlement 
processes); Harter, supra note 310, at 335-41 (discussing Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 
and confidentiality of mediation); Mark H. Grunewald, The Freedom of Information Act and 
Confidentiality Under the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act 12 (Admin. Conf. U.S., Apr. 
1995) (on file with author) (recommending Act be amended to provide thatAct.'s confidentiali-
ty section be deemed to specifically exempt records from disclosure under Exemption 3 of 
FOIA); Confidential Codificatwn, NAT'L L.J., June 12, 1995, at Bll (summarizing state 
legislation regarding confidentiality of mediation). 
339 Complete confidentiality may impair enforcement of agreements. Cf. D. Alan Rudlin 
& Kelly L. Faglioni, Confidentiality Comes at a Cost, NAT'L L.J., June 12, 1995, at B9-Bl0 
(discussing Snyder-Falkinham v. Stockburger, 457 S.E.2d 36 (Va. 1995), which raised, but 
did not resolve, issue of impact of confidentiality on enforcement of agreements). 
340 Rudlin & Faglioni, supra note 339, at Bll; see also 5 U.S.C. § 574(d) (1994) (providing 
under ADRA parties may agree to alternative confidentiality procedures). 
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agreements, such as those negotiated in the rapid charge process, 
and settlement agreements negotiated in EEOC conciliation 
proceedings.341 Even when courts have found federal jurisdiction, 
however, some have required the plaintiff to have exhausted her 
administrative remedies before filing a suit to enforce the agree-
ment. 342 
Recently, the Tenth Circuit held that an action to enforce a 
settlement agreement in a Title VII case was an action for breach 
of contract under state law, over which the federal court had no 
jurisdiction.343 The court distinguished Morris, an action to 
enforce a settlement agreement negotiated after a judicial action 
under Title VII, from those cases involving enforcement of concilia-
tion agreements or predetermination settlement agreements 
because federal enforceability under Title VII in such cases was 
341 See, e.g., EEOC v. Henry Beck Co., 729 F.2d 301, 305 (4th Cir. 1984) (holding 
settlement agreement negotiated under rapid charge processing procedure enforceable in 
federal court); EEOC v. Safeway Stores, 714 F.2d 567, 571-73 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding 
conciliation agreement enforceable by EEOC in federal court), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1204 
(1984); Sherman v. Standard Rate Data Serv., Inc., 709 F. Supp. 1433, 1440 (N.D. Ill. 1989) 
(holding apparent predetermination settlement agreement enforceable by employee in federal 
court); Kiper v. Louisiana St. Bd. of Elementary and Secondary Educ., 592 F. Supp. 1343, 
1359 (N.D. La. 1984) (holding conciliation agreement enforceable by employee in federal 
court), aff d, 778 F.2d 789 (5th Cir. 1985). 
342 Compare Blank v. Donovan, 780 F.2d 808, 809 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding settlement 
agreement negotiated pursuant to Title VII complaint not enforceable when Title VII 
administrative requirements were not exhausted) and Parsons v. Yellow Freight Sys., 741 
F.2d 871, 874 (6th Cir. 1984) (holding conciliation agreement not enforceable absent 
exhaustion of administrative remedies) with Eatmon v. Bristol Steel & Iron Works, 769 F.2d 
1503, 1508-10 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding exhaustion not required prior to enforcement action 
based on conciliation agreement although plaintiff waived right to file Title VII charges in 
agreement negotiated by Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs and no charges 
were ever filed with EEOC) and Sherman, 709 F. Supp. at 1440 (holding exhaustion of 
administrative remedies not required before action can be brought to enforce Title VII 
settlement agreement). In each of these cases, the enforcement action was filed by private 
plaintiffs. In EEOC v. Pierce Packing Co., 669 F.2d 605, 608-09 (9th Cir. 1982), the Ninth 
Circuit held that the EEOC may not seek enforcement of a predetermination settlement 
agreement before it investigates and finds reasonable cause. The Pierce court distinguished 
enforcement of agreements negotiated prior to determination, where no cause finding was 
ever made, from enforcement of conciliated agreements after a cause finding. Id. In 
Eatmon, however, the Eleventh Circuit found that preserving the goal of voluntary 
compliance and conciliation required courts to enforce all Title VII settlements without 
exhaustion, even when no timely claim of discrimination was-or even could have been-filed 
at the time of a settlement waiving the right to file such a claim. Eatmon, 769 F.2d at 1508-
10. 
343 Morris v. City of Hobart, 39 F.3d 1105 (10th Cir. 1994). 
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necessary to preserve the statutory enforcement scheme.344 
To ensure enforceability of mediated settlements in federal court, 
the ADA could be amended to make failure to comply with such 
settlements expressly illegal. Regardless, in order to make the 
mediation program a success, the administrative agencies should 
be willing to seek enforcement of agreements reached in agency-
sponsored mediation.345 EEOC policy recognizes the importance 
of enforceability, indicating that allegations of breach of a mediated 
settlement agreement will be investigated and the Agency will 
determine whether to seek enforcement. If noncompliance is rare, 
as is typical in most mediation programs, enforcement will not be 
a strain on agency resources. 
As long as mediation occurs prior to a determination of cause or 
during the conciliation process, federal jurisdiction probably exists. 
Enforcement agencies should support an individual seeking judicial 
enforcement of a mediated settlement agreement when requested, 
even if he has not exhausted the administrative procedures. Lack 
of enforceability would undermine the statutory scheme, allowing 
respondents to use conciliation as a delay tactic and possibly 
making proof of discrimination more difficult, thereby seriously 
prejudicing the complainants and the agency.346 Given the ADA!s 
encouragement of ADR, the arguments for federal enforceability of 
mediated settlement agreements without requiring exhaustion of 
administrative remedies are compelling and should be made 
forcefully by the EEOC. 
Administrative agencies play two other roles in the enforcement 
of mediated agreements. First, agencies should review settlement 
344 Id. at 1111-12 n.4. 
345 But see Pierce, 669 F.2d at 608-09 (holding EEOC may not seek enforcement of 
mediated settlement absent showing of genuine investigation nnd detcnninD.tion of 
reasonable cause). The EEOC should assert that exhaustion is not required because such 
a requirement would allow respondents to use settlement agreements as a delaying tactic, 
thereby prejudicing complainants in their efforts to remedy discrimination claims. See 
Eatnwn, 769 F.2d at 1510 (allowing employee to bring suit so as to presen-e congressional 
intent of Title VII). Notably, Eatnwn distinguished Pierce, arguing that in Pierce the EEOC 
was not merely trying to enforce a settlement agreement, but rather was trying to litigate 
additional discrimination issues without following administrative prerequisites to judicial 
action. Id. at 1511 n.9. 
346 EEOC v. Safeway Stores, 714 F.2d 567, 573 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1204 
(1984). 
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agreements for enforceability. Agencies could draft standard 
enforcement language as a guide for mediators and parties. 
Moreover, the initial agreement to mediate should provide that any 
settlement reached is enforceable by the agency.347 While such 
an agreement would not confer jurisdiction on federal courts, at a 
minimum it would allow the agency to seek enforcement on a 
contractual basis. Second, agency education on mediation should 
include information about enforcement of mediated agreements so 
decisions to mediate will be fully informed. 
In private mediations undertaken without filing an agency 
charge, a state's common law of contracts most likely will deter-
mine the enforceability of an agreement. 348 Because the media-
tion involves statutory rights and obligations, the mediator should, 
at a minimum, make the parties aware of enforceability issues. 
347 The mediated settlement agreements in the EEOC pilot project were enforceable by 
the agency. R. Gaull Silberman et al., Alternative Dispute Resolution of Employment 
Discrimination Claims, 54 LA. L. REV. 1533, 1557 (1994). Under the Chicago Commission 
on Human Relations mediation procedure, the Commission requires the parties to 
acknowledge in the settlement agreement the Commission's jurisdiction to seek judicial 
enforcement of the agreement. Chicago Rules, supra note 247, at § 230.130(b). The D.C. 
Department of Human Rights settlement form contains language specifying that the 
Department will determine whether the parties have complied with the terms of the 
agreement in the event of a dispute. Negotiated Settlement Agreement 1 (Gov't of District 
of Columbia, Dep't of Human Rights and Minority Business Dev.) (standardized form) (on 
file with author). To date, no enforcement disputes have been brought to the attention of the 
Department. 
348 If courts follow the reasoning of Morris v. City of Hobart, federal jurisdiction is 
unlikely simply because a settlement agreement purports to resolve a federal claim when the 
claim was never filed with an agency or court. While Hobart relied in part on the fact that 
the parties could have provided for continuing federal jurisdiction in the settlement 
agreement, it found no independent basis for federaljurisdiction. Morris v. City of Hobart, 
39 F.3d 1105, 1110-1112 (10th Cir. 1994). But see Eatmon, 769 F.2d at 1509-10 (holding 
federal court had jurisdiction over employee suit for enforcement under Title VII). Recently, 
the Supreme Court held that enforcement of a settlement agreement requires its own basis 
for jurisdiction, which must be more than the fact that the settlement produced the dismissal 
of an earlier federal action. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 114 S. Ct. 1673, 1675-76 
(1994). If a private settlement agreement is negotiated after the filing of a charge and the 
charge is withdrawn, the argument for federal jurisdiction is stronger. See Eatmon, 769 F.2d 
at 1509-10 (finding federal jurisdiction for enforcement of settlement agreement negotiated 
with Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs and waiving right to file Title VII 
claim). When a private mediation agency conducts a mediation under contract or grant from 
the federal investigative agency, the argument for federal jurisdiction is stronger because the 
mediation has become a part of the statutory enforcement process. See supra note 341 
(collecting relevant cases). 
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The agreement should provide for the resolution of disputes about 
compliance. Indeed, the agreement might require mediation of 
such disputes, perhaps with the same mediator. It is to the 
advantage of all parties to settle the dispute completely, including 
agreement on how to resolve compliance issues. 
Instead of filing an enforcement suit, an individual faced with 
breach of the agreement might simply file a charge of discrimina-
tion with the enforcement agency.349 The EEOC should investi-
gate and consider such cases with great care. Where a respondent's 
noncompliance was motivated by the claimant's disability or was a 
continuation of the original discrimination, the Agency should 
pursue the case actively, in order to encourage private resolution 
through mediation and discourage respondents attempting to 
escape the consequences of disability discrimination by negotiating 
private settlement agreements with which they do not intend to 
comply.350 
g. Agency Review and Approval of Settlements. While the 
EEO C's definition of fairness does not mention agency review and 
approval of settlements, such review can help to ensure fairness. 
Agency involvement can range from simply dismissing the charge 
based on the parties' representation that a settlement agreement 
has been reached, to formal review and refusal to dismiss the 
charge unless the agency is satisfied that the settlement represents 
an adequate remedy for the discrimination. Where the issues 
involve statutory rights and referral to mediation is part of the 
agency's process, it should retain a role in settlements. Whether or 
not the mediator is an agency employee, the referring agency 
should review mediated settlement agreements for consistency with 
the statute, approving agreements that meet established criteria 
349 Under Titles II and ill, an individual may file a discrimination action in court without 
filing a charge with the agency. However, the individual would have to prove that the 
defendant's noncompliance constituted discrimination under the statute. 
350 Respondents may attempt to avoid liability by invoking the statute of limitations, 
which requires a plaintiff to file a charge within 180 days of the discriminatory conduct. (300 
days injurisdictions having a state or local deferral agency). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1988). 
The EEOC should be prepared to argue that. the statute of limitations should be equitably 
tolled or that the defendant's conduct estopped its use. See supra note 268 (discussing 
tolling of statute of limitations). 
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and thereby warrant dismissal or withdrawal of charges.351 The 
EEOC's current regulations permit the Agency to sign any prede-
termination settlement agreement agreed to by the parties and to 
agree not to process the charge further.352 Alternatively, its 
regulations authorize facilitation of the settlement by allowing the 
claimant to withdraw his charge.353 
The range of acceptable settlement agreements should be broad 
because cases vary widely in their facts and strength. Neverthe-
less, to the extent possible, an agency should ensure that charging 
parties having strong cases are not coerced to settle for little or 
nothing solely because of their lack of power or money354 and that 
respondents are not coerced to pay significant sums to charging 
parties in frivolous cases merely to avoid prohibitive litigation costs 
or bad publicity. While an agency cannot prevent a settlement 
desired by the parties, the agency can continue to process the 
charge and it can-and should-continue its investigation when it 
believes the agreement does not effectively remedy discrimination. 
Additionally, an agency's review process can be used to identify 
repeat offenders who may have systemic discrimination problems 
that are being settled through individual complaints. This will help 
prevent sacrificing the goal of resolving systemic discrimination to 
the goal of resolving individual disputes quickly. Should the EEOC 
or the Department of Justice discover systemic discrimination, they 
can utilize their litigation authority to redress it. 
While review of settlements will add to an agency's workload, the 
corresponding reduction in investigations should provide adequate 
compensation. To minimize the added burden, an agency can 
351 Lawyers Committee Comments, supra note 169, at 3. Because the agencies enforcing 
Titles I, II, and III have the authority to litigate violations of the statute, either on their own 
or through the Justice Department, they also have authority to approve or reject settlements 
of disputes. Similarly, the FCC may accept settlements as final judgments or may take 
action to enforce the statute despite the settlement. 
352 29 C.F.R. § 1601.20(a) (1995). The EEOC's regulations also mandate conciliation 
efforts when reasonable cause is found. Id. § 1601.24. 
353 Id. 1601.20(b). 
354 The EEOC recently rescinded its policy of seeking a full remedy in every case because 
the policy tended to impede settlement. EEOC: House Panel Elicits Details on Changes 
Under Way at EEOC, supra note 84, at A-9. This change will facilitate settlement, but the 
Agency should nevertheless exercise its authority in order to avoid coercion ofless powerful 
parties in the settlement process. Cf. Larson, supra note 218, at 409 (noting that Industrial 
Commission approval of mediated settlements is safeguard against unfair agreements). 
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create either guidelines for settlement approval or settlement 
agreement forms containing standardized language. To avoid 
significant restrictions on the creativity of the parties or the 
mediator, however, such guidelines or settlement forms must be 
flexible. Nevertheless, language regarding enforcement of the 
settlement should be required. 
Development of settlement guidelines may provide other benefits 
as well. These guidelines can assist the mediator and the parties 
in determining what an appropriate settlement might contain.355 
Such a guide would be particularly useful in balancing power and 
promoting fairness when a party is mediating without representa-
tion. At a minimum, guidelines should include the full remedies 
available if the case were successfully litigated.356 On the down-
side, individuals with weak cases or no legal advice might rigidly 
adhere to the guidelines and develop unrealistic expectations of 
what they will receive in settlement.357 
As another possible approach to settlement review, an agency 
could require that the mediator or the parties submit a brief 
statement to the agency in support of the proposed settlement 
agreement. Such a statement could summarize the facts and the 
factual and legal disputes, thereby enabling the agency to deter-
mine whether to approve the agreement. Given the confidential 
nature of mediation, both parties should agree to the statement 
before it is submitted to the agency. Because such a requirement 
might hinder negotiations by adding yet another issue to the 
process of resolution, and because it is unclear whether the 
statement would truly provide valuable information to the agency, 
agencies should experiment with this requirement before universal 
implementation. 
Private and employer-sponsored mediation programs do not 
directly implicate agency review of a settlement. However, an 
employee dissatisfied '\vith a mediation agreement might file a 
charge with the EEOC. Where participation in mediation was 
355 See Larson, supra note 218, at 410 (suggesting that to avoid disnpproval of mediated 
agreements, mediators in workers' compensation cases should become familiar with 
Industrial Commission's standards for approving setUements). 
356 PEER Study, supra note 171, at 152-53. 
357 A knowledgeable and skilled mediator should act. as a reality check for the 
complainant. 
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voluntary, the EEOC should defer to the mediated settlement if it 
was made both knowingly and truly voluntarily, if the process was 
fair and regular, and if the result is consistent with the ADA. 358 
Should the EEOC decide not to proceed, it nevertheless should 
issue a right-to-sue letter to the individual. 
4. Technical Expertise. The EEOC policy does not mention 
technical experts, perhaps because the policy applies to all statutes 
under the Agency's jurisdiction. On the other hand, the ACUS 
Recommendation encourages exploration of technical expertise 
sources for assistance in mediation. The importance of such 
expertise cannot be overemphasized. Because of the often complex 
nature of ADA claims, technical expertise may be crucial to 
achieving settlement. Engineers, architects, rehabilitation experts, 
and experts in the impact of particular disabilities are among those 
whose input might be required in a given case. 
One method of accessing such expertise is to train mediators on 
the available sources of technical assistance. Another method is to 
train such experts in mediation sk.ills.359 Both government 
agencies and private mediation services should ascertain whether 
mediators have such expertise and assign cases on that basis. 
Additionally, they should encourage individuals with the required 
expertise to participate in mediator training.360 Such training 
could be either funded with technical assistance grants or under-
taken by the FMCS, which already has resources for mediator 
training. 361 
If the mediator is not an expert, the cost of obtaining an expert 
becomes an issue. Although the parties to the dispute could agree 
to pay for a third-party expert, if agencies provide technical 
assistance at little or no cost, this will facilitate resolution of 
358 See DISPUTE RESOLUTION UNDER THE ADA, supra note •• at 659·60. These criteria 
draw upon the NLRB's standards for deferral to arbitration. Id. at 659. The agency also can 
use this review to ensure that there are no systemic discrimination issues which were 
ignored in mediation. 
3.19 In labor arbitration, for example, the parties may select an arbitrator with the 
expertise relevant to the subject matter of the dispute, such as an industrial engineer or 
doctor. FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA A ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 142 (4th ed. 1985). 
360 For example, government employees with related training, knowledge, and experience 
could be encouraged to train as mediators. 
361 Moreover, as a part of training, technical experts can serve as co-mediators, thereby 
providing their expertise while learning mediation techniques. 
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disputes.362 Thus, agencies should attempt to obtain experts 
willing to work pro bono or at low cost.363 Alternatively, agencies 
could set aside funds for technical assistance on an ad hoc basis as 
deemed necessary by the mediator. Third, agencies could employ 
one or more trained experts specifically for mediation. The problem 
with this approach is that it may be difficult to find a few individu-
als with expertise in the broad range of areas likely to be needed 
in ADA disputes. Regardless, a mediation program that provides 
technical expertise will truly further the statutory goal of encourag-
ing voluntary compliance. 
5. Monitoring and Evaluation. The key to a successful media-
tion program is continued monitoring, evaluation, and revision 
where necessary to accomplish the goals of the program.364 
Agencies adopting an ADA mediation program, whether private or 
public, should structure the program to enable an empirical 
evaluation based on specific criteria established prior to the 
commencement of the program.365 These criteria should be 
developed with the assistance of the Advisory Committee or the 
stakeholders. Employing a professional evaluator will facilitate 
creation of a system that will provide the data necessary to 
determine whether a mediation program is meeting its goals. 
The evaluation process should include the parties, the mediators, 
362 For example, the actual construction cost of making a business accessible might be 
small, but the business might need an architect to determine how to access the facility most 
easily and to draw up plans for doing so. Without the architect's expertise, the parties may 
be unaware of the low-cost accessibility option and might be unwilling to pay for the 
architect's services without some assurance that the investment will resolve the dispute. 
363 Alternatively, the federal agencies could establish a worksharing arrangement with 
other federal agencies already employing individuals with relevant technical expertise. 
Moreover, state rehabilitation agencies or private disability-related organizations may have 
experts who are available at little or no cost. The Chicago Commission on Human Righta 
uses experts from the City's Office for People with Disabilities to identify changes that will 
make a facility accessible and to prepare blueprinta for the design change, thereby 
facilitating settlement by saving money for the affected business. Information from Miriam 
I. Pickus, Deputy Commissioner, Chicago Commission on Human Relations. 
364 lMPLEMENTINGTHEADRACT, supra note 4, at 55-58; Dispute Systems Design Working 
Group, Performance Indicators for ADR Program Evaluation 1 (Admin. Conf. U.S., Nov. 
1993); see also Elizabeth Rolph & Erik Moller, Eualuating Agency Altematiue Dispute 
Resolution Programs: A Users' Guide to Data Collection and Use Unstitute For Civil Justice 
1995) (providing guidelines for effective evaluation). 
365 Designing Systems, supra note 209, § I, at 8-9. 
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and any agency personnel involved in the process.366 Data col-
lected from the program results should include settlement rates, 
both overall and by type of case, use of party representatives and 
use of technical expertise; overall party satisfaction, by type of case 
and by existence or nonexistence of representation; comparison of 
mediated settlements with settlement guidelines, with settlements 
reached through other processes, and with litigation results;367 
assessment of mediator quality;368 impact on systemic litigation; 
changes in case backlogs; comparative processing time of mediated 
cases and other cases; rate of party compliance; agency approval 
rates of mediated settlements; and relative costs and benefits of the 
mediation project.369 Collection and analysis of this data should 
assist in answering the following questions:370 
(1) Is the mediation program consistent with statuto-
ry goals? 
(2) Does the mediation program adversely impact 
systemic litigation of ADA issues? 
(3) Does the mediation program reduce case process-
ing time or case backlog? 
( 4) Does mediation reduce the cost of case processing 
for the parties or the government? 
(5) At what point in the investigation process is 
mediation most effective? 
(6) Is mediation more effective for certain types of 
cases? 
366 EEOC Report on ADR Pilot Program, supra note 99, at 5, 6; PEER Study, supra note 
171, at 13. 
387 This comparison will facilitate the determination of whether particular groups are 
being disadvantaged by mediation. Precise comparability with litigation results cannot be 
expected, however, as settlement generally involves compromise. 
368 For useful discussions on selection and evaluation of mediators, see Christopher 
Honeyman, Five Elements of Mediation, 4 NEGOTIATION J. 149 (1988); Christopher 
Honeyman, On Evaluating Mediators, 6 NEGOTIATION J. 23 (1990); SPIDR Commission on 
Qualifications Report, supra note 295, at 17-18. 
369 Some of these criteria, such as the impact on systemic litigation and changes in case 
backlogs, will not be relevant in private mediation. Additionally, these criteria should 
incorporate the question of whether settlements are reached in cases in which mediators 
believe that discrimination occurred. 
370 Of course, each of these questions will not be relevant to every mediation program. 
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(7) Does mediation disadvantage individuals \vith 
disabilities or other historically disadvantaged 
groups?371 
(8) Is the process equally fair and effective for both 
represented and unrepresented parties? 
(9) Are comparable results reached in mediated 
settlements, in settlements obtained through other 
processes, and in similar litigation? 
(10) What are the best sources of qualified media-
tors? 
(11) Have the parties complied with mediated settle-
ments? 
(12) Has a common group of mediators been effective 
in handling disputes under the various titles of the 
ADA and have they achieved the promised efficiency? 
(13) Has the availability of technical expertise 
affected settlement? 
(14) Is agency approval of mediated settlements 
effective or necessary?372 
505 
Program and mediator evaluations must be careful not to 
overemphasize settlement rates. The goal of statutory enforcement 
should not be outweighed by the goal of settlement, which is likely 
if settlement rates become the crucial factor in evaluations. 
Unfortunately, because settlement is the goal of mediation, 
mediators will measure their own success by whether settlement 
has occurred. Agencies should counterbalance the mediator's 
371 This is the most important question to be answered because if mediation disadvantag-
es the very individuals that the ADA was designed to protect, it conflicts with the purpose 
of the statute and should not be used. 
372 In addition, the program can test the effectiveness of some of the specific proposals set 
forth in this Article, thus providing a basis for retaining or altering them in the future. For 
example, the program could use several sources of mediators and compare their effectiveness, 
or evaluate the impact of educational programs on participation rates and power imbnlnnces. 
Furthermore, the program could analyze the effect of the timing of mediation in the 
investigation process, or it could examine the impact on settlement of factors such as the 
characteristics of the parties or the cases. The EEOC pilot project found that the size of the 
employer, the type of respondent, the type of case (e.g., discharge or accommodation), and 
the strength of evidence of discrimination were significantly related to settlement. EEOC 
Mediation Program Evaluation, supra note 100, at 42-45. 
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corresponding tendency to push for settlement at all costs by 
reassuring them that some cases will not-and should not-settle 
and by recognizing that fact when evaluating mediators. 
Analysis of each ADA mediation program, both public and 
private, will establish a knowledge base that enables design of the 
most effective mediation programs in the future. If the programs 
demonstrate that mediation is a fair and satisfactory method of 
resolving disputes, more individuals and businesses will be 
encouraged to participate in mediation. The result may be both 
expansion of agency-sponsored mediation and growth of private 
mediation of ADA disputes, thereby reducing agency caseloads 
without detracting from statutory goals. Assuming that initial 
evaluation establishes that the program has merit, systematic 
evaluation should be continued on a regular basis. Continuing 
evaluation will provide the data needed to alter a program as 
necessary to ensure successful mediation or to eliminate a program 
no longer meeting its goals. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
A mediation program designed in accordance with the guidelines 
set forth in this Article will further the goal of eliminating 
discrimination by enabling individuals with disabilities and 
employers to negotiate agreements for voluntary compliance with 
the ADA. Speedy, cost-effective resolution of ADA disputes benefits 
complainants, respondents, and society by efficiently integrating 
individuals with disabilities into the workplace. Moreover, a 
program incorporating these guidelines will promote satisfaction 
and compliance with mediated solutions. 
ADA enforcement agencies, private mediation agencies, and 
employers have begun to implement mediation programs. In 
developing effective programs to mediate employment disputes, 
several elements are crucial. Consultation with representatives of 
the disability community, employers, government entities, and 
labor organizations will ensure that mediation programs meet their 
needs. Additionally, such programs must be designed to empower 
rather than disadvantage the participating parties, particularly the 
individuals with disabilities the ADA was enacted to protect. 
Finally, continuing evaluation and revision will ensure that 
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mediation programs remain effective in accomplishing their goals. 
Program evaluation may demonstrate that revision of some 
approaches recommended in this Article is necessary; however, if 
programs are developed with these principles in mind, mediation 
should become an additional tool in the ADA enforcement arsenal. 
